Enclosure: “Melting in Fear”

Joshua 3-4 is enclosed with two slightly varied expressions of the Canaanites “melting” in fear (2:24 and 5:1), indicating that Joshua 3-4 is a unit. This expression is used twice in Rahab’s speech (2:9, 11), and repeated in the spies’ report (2:24). In Joshua 2, the cause of the fearful “melting” is attributed to YHWH’s “drying” the Red Sea for Israel. In Joshua 5:1, the hearts of the pagans are further “melted,” this time due to YHWH’s “drying” the Jordan for Israel.

Evidently, YHWH leads Israel over the Jordan partly to cause fear among her enemies. This stands in sharp contrast to YHWH’s repeated command for Joshua, “be strong and courageous, do not be terrified,” throughout the book. The same event of crossing the river gives Israel courage and causes fear among the pagans. The fear of Israel’s enemies is manifested when Jericho closes its gate (6:1), when Gibeon makes peace with Israel (Chapter 9), and when the five kings form an alliance out of fear (10:2-5). Only in the cases of Ai (Chapters 7-8) and the Northern Confederacy (Chapter 11) are Israel’s enemies portrayed as stupidly fearless. In most of Joshua’s conquest, the courage of Israel and the fear of the pagans caused by the crossing of the Jordan serve as a basis for Israel’s military success.

Keyword:‘abar

Another unique feature in Joshua 3-4 is the keyword “‘abar” (עָבַר), which occurs 21 times in the pericope. This verb means “pass over, through, by, pass on” (Brown-Driver-Briggs).

While many structural parallels exist between the Red Sea passage and the Jordan passage, John Hamlin observes that the word ‘abar is an important feature distinguishing the two events. In the Red Sea event (Exodus 14), this word was never used. Hamlin comments: “The reason for this is that the verb ‘abar implies crossing over a boundary, whether physical like a river valley (Deuteronomy 2:13-14), political like a nation’s border (Deuteronomy 2:18), or moral, as to enter a covenant (Deuteronomy 29:12) or transgress a commandment (Deuteronomy 26:13; Joshua 7:11, 15).”

The Red Sea passage was only exodus out of Egypt. Israel had not yet crossed over into the promise land. The crossing of the Jordan, however, marks the first step in the final fulfillment of God’s promise of the land during that stage of the history of redemption, hence the keyword ‘abar.

Characterization

Characterization is also significant in Joshua 3-4. We find a very interesting shift when we move from Chapter 2 to Chapter 3. In Chapter 2, the major characters are Rahab and the two spies. Joshua sent two spies into Canaan, and Rahab the prostitute protected the two spies because she feared the LORD. In Chapter 3, the focus shifts back to Joshua, who is without a doubt the human hero in the larger context of the Book of Joshua. The other major character placed in the spotlight in Chapters 3 and 4 is God, and actually the various names of God appears more frequently than the name Joshua in these two chapters. This is an important feature when we contrast it with Chapter 2, because in the entire chapter of Joshua 2, the narrator never mentions the name of God, not even once. God is only mentioned in the dialogue between Rahab and the two spies, as if God’s actions and providence were only implicitly presupposed in this chapter. Joshua 2 does not talk about God’s intervention in the event. It only implicitly presents God’s providence by focusing on human decisions and historical contingencies.

In Joshua 3 and 4, however, God becomes active in the narration once more, and in these two chapters, we not only encounter divine speech, but also divine action. God speaks to Joshua, and God opens a path for Israel by cutting off the flow of the river. I think the silence on the narrator’s part about God in Joshua 2 is really a commentary on the part of the author to highlight the fact that crossing the Jordan was not a contingent event. God was actively at work here. It was God who opened the Jordan for Israel as He opened the Red Sea before. So we see that in this very intricate literature, even characterization has profound theological implications.

Motif: The Ark

Now we move on to a significant motif in Joshua 3 and 4, the Ark of the Covenant. It is mentioned nineteen times in the two chapters. The first time it is mentioned is in 3:3, and immediately this Ark is identified as the “Ark of the Covenant of YHWH.” In fact, in these two chapters, the Ark is most frequently called the “Ark of the Covenant.” Sometimes it is called “Ark of the LORD” or simply “the Ark.” It is called the “Ark of the Testimony” once, which is the name by which it was called when it was first made in Exodus 25. But we see that in Joshua 3 and 4, the Ark is most intimately connected to the covenant of the LORD.

Now, before we examine how the Ark-of-the-Covenant motif unfolds in the literary structure of Joshua 3 and 4 and how this develops into theological themes, let us first go through a quick review on what this Ark is all about.

In Exodus 24, Moses went up to Mount Sinai to receive the tablets of the law and instructions on building the tabernacle. The very first thing that Moses was instructed to build was the Ark of the Testimony. The reason why it was called the Ark of the Testimony is that the Testimony, namely, the stone tablets on which the Law was written, was to be placed inside the Ark. This Law is more than a statement of legal rules and principles as in modern statute law. Archaeological findings suggest that the two stone tablets should have carried identical contents. Traditionally scholars had thought that the Law that God gave to Moses was too long and had to be written on two stone tablets, but archaeologists have found that in international treaties of the Ancient Near East between a greater, suzerain nation and a smaller, vassal nation, the same covenant would be written down twice on two separate tablets. The two tablets are to be kept by the vassal perhaps as a symbol of the presence of the covenant-making suzerain. I will not get into too much detail on this tangent. Suffice it to say that what the Ark of the Testimony signifies is the presence of the covenant-making LORD, the God who made His covenant and dwelling with the elect nation of Israel.

As we shall see, this Ark motif with its covenant theme will develop into a profound theological statement through the structure of Joshua 3 and 4. So now, finally we get to really engage with the text here.

Structural Feature 1: Concentric Structure of Promises and Fulfillments

There are three structural features that I want to explore. The first one is a series of promises and fulfillments structured concentrically, as follows:

Figure 1: Concentric Structure of Promises and Fulfillments

Promise A is found in 3:7, which is God’s promise to Joshua that He will exalt Joshua as He did Moses before all Israel. Then we have Promise B in 3:10, where Joshua promises that Israel will be led by the Ark of the LORD in crossing the river. This is to say that God himself will lead Israel to cross the Jordan, because the Ark is a symbol of God’s covenantal presence with Israel. Although it is Joshua making the promise here, we should note a literary subtlety in these two chapters. That is, whenever Joshua speaks to the people, he would say something before God says it, and then what Joshua says to the people will always be confirmed by a divine speech or action later. This is an indication that Joshua’s instructions to the people in these two chapters are prophetic in nature; he is really speaking what God would have him speak. So when Joshua makes a promise to the people in 3:10, it is really a divine promise. Now, in the same speech by Joshua we find Promise C in 3:13, whereby the “waters flowing downstream will be cut off and stand up in a heap.”

Then in 3:16, we have the fulfillment of Promise C, whereby “the water flowing down to the Sea of Arabah was completely cut off” and “the water from upstream piled up in a heap a great distance away.” Next comes the fulfillment of Promise B in 4:11, where all the people were led by the Ark of the Covenant to the other side of the river. Lastly we have the fulfillment of the Promise A in 4:14—YHWH exalts Joshua in the eyes of all of Israel like He did Moses.

Here we see a concentric series of promises and fulfillments. By concentric I mean the structure in Figure 1: A-B-C-C’-B’-A’. I think this concentric series of promises and fulfillments that stretches through Joshua 3 and 4 is a statement about the covenant theme embedded in these two chapters. The covenant has to do with divine promises. God makes three great promises in Joshua 3. Each promise gets that much more difficult and that much more supernatural and miraculous. Yet one by one, each of these promises is fulfilled. It is God who by His sovereign grace fulfills all these impossible promises. And when we relate these promises and fulfillments to the covenant theme, we can see that when God makes a covenant with His people, He shall faithfully fulfill His promises despite any human or natural obstacles.

Structural Feature 2: Narrative Suspense

Now we may move on to the next structural feature. I would like to call it “narrative suspense”. It is the kind of structure whereby the reader would first encounter a brief, ambiguous, and general statement about a future event, and is left to wonder how the plot is going to develop on the basis of this statement. It is not really foreshadowing, because the statement is a concrete but general statement about what is going to happen. We just do not know how it will happen. Eventually it is going to happen, so we will learn how it happens, but still we will not know why it happens until the very end. So basically we learn that something is going to happen, and later on we learn about how it happens, and in the end we learn about why it happens. The narrative suspense in Joshua 3-4 is as shown in Figure 2 below, which I shall explain:

Figure 2: Two Lines of Suspended Plot

In 3:3-4, Joshua tells the people to follow the Ark unto a path that they have never trodden before. Then in 3:5, Joshua says that God will do amazing things among them. The people do not know how it is going to happen. The reader does not know how it is going to happen. Joshua does not tell the people why they should follow the Ark of the Covenant.

Then in 3:12, Joshua tells the people to choose twelve men from the tribes of Israel, one from each tribe. Again, at this point, neither the people nor the reader knows what God and Joshua are going to do with the twelve men. The reader is left hanging here, as Joshua goes on to talk about something else.

As events unfold, in 3:13-17, we learn of what the amazing thing that God was going to do is. The river literally piled up in a heap and stopped flowing, and the Israelites crossed the Jordan on dry land! But what do we make of this? Why did God choose to lead Israel to the other side of the river this way? We still do not know.

Now, the narration returns to the twelve men chosen from each tribe in 4:2. Notice that God commands Joshua after crossing the river what Joshua already commanded Israel before crossing the river: “Choose twelve men from among the people, one from each tribe.” This goes back to the point that we made earlier about Joshua always speaking what God would have him speak in these two chapters. So in Chapter 4, the people and the reader learn what Joshua was going to do with the twelve men. They are to pick twelve stones from the middle of the Jordan to be a memorial to the people of Israel forever. But a memorial for what? The reader is still left hanging.

In any case, we have now seen each preliminary element of suspense repeated once, and each time the picture becomes clearer. First, Israel is told to follow the Ark, for God will do an amazing thing. This is repeated and we learn what the amazing thing is. Second, Israel is told to choose twelve men, one from each tribe. This is repeated, and we learn what the twelve men are chosen to do.

Finally, these two lines of suspended plot converge in the end and are repeated for the last time, and everything becomes clear. 4:21-24 seems to be a repetition of 4:5-7, but it actually goes one level deeper. 4:23 says that YHWH dried up the Jordan just as He dried up the Red Sea. Here we learn that the Jordan-passage is the beginning of the final stage of God’s deliverance (for that generation, that is)—out of Egypt and into Canaan. And what is all of this for? Why should the sons of Israel remember this? The answers lie in 4:24: “God did this so that all the peoples of the earth might know that the hand of the LORD is powerful and so that you might always fear the LORD your God.” Everything in this whole narrative unit (Joshua 3-4) converges to this last statement.

Structural Feature 3: “Ark of the Covenant of the Lord of all the Earth”

This is in fact foreshadowed in subtle elements before the conclusion of Joshua 3-4. 3:10 and 13 identify the Ark as “Ark of the Covenant of the LORD of all the earth” (“כּל־הארץ אדון הבּרית ארון”). YHWH is not just the LORD of Israel. Going into Canaan and chasing out all the pagans was an act of proclaiming the universal Lordship of God. It was for all the people of the earth to know that the living God was with Israel in a covenant relationship.

In Canaanite religion, a false god called Baal was believed to be the highest god who triumphed over the river god. When Joshua and Israel crossed the Jordan by means of a miracle, it was the living God proclaiming that there is no other god. Baal was no match for YHWH.

So what was it that led Israel to the other side of Jordan? This leads to our discussion of the third literary element in Joshua 4. This is a rather small one, but a very important one. It is a little repetition in Joshua 4:7: “…the flow of the Jordan was cut off before the Ark of the covenant of the LORD. When [the Ark] crossed the Jordan, the waters of the Jordan were cut off.”

The same statement is repeated in two consecutive sentences in the same verse—this is to highlight the fact that it was the covenantal presence of YHWH that cut off the flow of the river. It might have been due to a natural cause such as a landslide, but in any case it was God who stopped the flow of the river. When Israel crossed the Jordan, it was by YHWH’s sovereign power over all of creation. Moreover, it was for the sake of His covenant with Israel. It was the Ark of the Covenant before which the flow of the river was cut off. The priests were carrying the Ark of the Covenant. They stepped into the river, and the flow was cut off, and all Israel walked over to the other side of the Jordan on dry ground. This tells us that God is the fulfiller of His promises, the author and finisher of the history of salvation, the alpha and the omega, the first and the last.

Conclusion: Literary and Theological Coherence

At this point, we have seen that Joshua 3-4 is much more than a mere patchwork of contradictory sources and traditions (contra Noth and other historical critics). Intricate literary features such as narrative suspense and concentric structures evince the fact that the repetitions in Joshua 3-4, far from being a sign literary incompetence, are indications of a coherent and meaningful text. At many junctures, we have also noted how literary elements in Joshua 3-4 are artfully connected to other parts of the conquest narratives in Joshua. Though Joshua 3-4 is narrated in a different style than the rest of Joshua 1-12, the interconnections that we observed between them are strong enough to illustrate literary coherence between Joshua 3-4 and the rest of the conquest narratives.

So what do we make of this literary coherence? The most important thing, I suggest, is that this literary coherence be understood as a vehicle for theological coherence. We have seen how various literary elements in Joshua 3-4 testify to YHWH as the covenant-making LORD with Israel, Sovereign over all the earth, the God who fulfils His promises despite human and natural obstacles, the Warrior who melted away the courage of the enemies of His people, and the Deliverer who works faith among those whom He has chosen. These theological messages, taken together, coherently issue a great invitation to the reader: Learn to know God as God, and as God-for-us.

我們這一講的題目是「成聖的呼召：與人生的難題共存」。所謂成聖，就是追求像神一樣的聖潔完美。但「追求完美」與「完美主義」是兩個截然不同的概念。追求完美的人，知道自己不完美，也能坦然面對自己的不完美；然而完美主義者，是用一種律法主義的眼光來面對一切不完美的事物，他們無法容忍人生中的任何殘缺。

我們的人生總是充滿各種難題。從基督教的角度來說，人生中最大的問題就是罪，罪是一切難題的源頭。過去這一年當中，我跟各位不斷思想的一個真理就是因信稱義。因信稱義的真理告訴我們，人都是罪人，信了主以後還是罪人，而且一輩子都是罪人。我們所得著的義，不是神放在我們本性當中的，在本性上我們仍然是罪人，而且一輩子都不能脫離這個罪性。我們所得著的義，是基督的義歸算給我們，真正成為我們的義，卻永遠不是我們自身所成就的義。這一套聽起來有點抽像的神學，有個非常現實的意義，就是我們在這一生當中，需要不斷面對罪的問題，也必須與罪所帶來的種種難題共存。這就代表我們今生必定充滿各樣的難題、各樣的苦難、各樣的焦慮。

在華人教會裡面，有一種神學非常流行，它主張信徒應該憑信站在屬靈高原，總是覺得自己跟神很親近，作一些事情讓自己覺得自己很敬虔，就自我感覺良好，並且無法容忍屬靈生命中有任何的殘缺。這不是聖經的教導。聖經教導我們在屬靈的低谷中學習成聖；我們學習更認識自己、更認識神，學習否定自己而仰賴神的恩典，是藉由今生一切的挫敗、難題，甚至有的時候我們遇到困難卻感受不到神的同在。有的時候我們覺得神離我們很遠，周圍的屬靈長輩就會責備我們沒有信心，但神卻不是這樣看我們。很多時候，神最豐盛的恩典是在我們遇到屬靈低潮的時候賜給我們的，儘管我們不一定當時就能感受得到。

我們很多人都聽過「足印」這首詩，Footprints。有一個人跟上帝一起走在沙灘上。這個人回頭看，發現他走過的路上，有些地方只有一對腳印；他又發現，這些只有一對腳印的地方，正好是他人生中最痛苦、最低潮的時候。這個人很苦惱，就問上帝：「主啊，祢說如果我跟隨祢，祢就會永遠與我同在。但我人生中最痛苦的那些時光，祢都跑到哪裡去了？」上帝回答他說：「孩子啊，你看到沙灘上有些地方只有一對腳印，是因為每當你走不下去的時候，我就把你扛在背上，揹著你走過那些艱難的光陰。」

我個人不是很喜歡這首詩，因為有點太煽情了，可是在神學上我是完全同意的。這首詩講述的神學，是真正的恩典神學，跟華人教會裡面流行的那套敬虔主義截然不同。不知道各位有沒有讀過本仁約翰的《天路歷程》。本仁約翰的天路客，也是在道路最黑暗的時候經歷神最豐盛的恩典。他走過一個地方叫作死蔭幽谷，是神的恩典保守他安全渡過。他也犯了一些錯，使他差點偏離救恩的道路，但神差派一些人把他帶回正路。後來他來到了約旦河邊，河水高漲，很危險，但他必須渡過這條河。他的朋友告訴他，雖然這水如此冰冷苦澀，但到達彼岸的盼望就好像炙熱火紅的炭在他心中。聖經裡面也有好多的教導還有信心偉人的故事，讓我們看見，基督徒是藉由軟弱、挫敗、困境、苦難、罪惡、不公義的事情，才能真正認識恩典的上帝。如果我們要細細討論，時間就不夠了，所以今天我想專門討論四個重點：一、在懷疑中成聖；二、在苦難中成聖；三、在挫敗中成聖；四、在罪惡中成聖。

懷疑是基督徒信仰最大的敵人。人類的原罪就是懷疑。亞當吃分別善惡樹上的果子的時候，最核心的動機就是懷疑。所謂懷疑主義，是一種自我絕對化，什麼都懷疑，完全相信的只有自己。亞當吃樹上果子的時候，他並沒有完全相信蛇的話，但他也沒有完全信靠神，他相信的只有自己的判斷。「我誰都不信，就連上帝也不能完全相信，我只信我自己，我要用自己的理性來分別善惡。」所以亞當就吃了樹上的果子。他選擇了懷疑。而由於我們都是亞當的後裔，我們也都生在這種懷疑論的原罪底下。

雖然我們已經信了主耶穌，但我們仍然時常面對懷疑的試探。我們有時候會懷疑神的存在。對於那些蒙神恩賜能夠免於這種試探的人，我們仍然常常會懷疑神的恩典。這種懷疑，使得我們無法先求神的國和神的義，因為我們懷疑神是否會賜下日用的飲食。我們為明天憂慮，因為我們懷疑那位掌管明天的神。有的時候我們會找一些理由將我們的懷疑合理化。我們會說：「我不是不信靠神，我只是不相信人；我不信任環境；人生無常，我實在沒辦法不為明天憂慮。」說這種話的人，表露出他們對掌管萬有的主宰的不信任。

然而，只要我們還是罪人，那麼就算我們已經走在成聖的道路上，我們仍然無法完全免於這種不信靠神的試探。我們總會對神抱有某種程度的懷疑。當我們懷疑神的時候，我們要學會持定一個真理，這真理就是：我們的神大過一切的事物。上帝大過我們的理性；上帝大過我們的經驗；上帝大過我們的情感；上帝大過我們的良知。我們不能用我們的理性來檢驗神的真理。我們要用神的真理來檢驗一切理性的認知。我們不能用我們的經驗來檢驗神的恩典；反之，神的恩典要聖化我們的經驗。我們不能用我們的良知來檢驗神的良善。神的良善是一切善惡的準則尺度。當你拿你心中那把扭曲的尺來衡量神的時候，你就把你的神看得太小了。莊子說，以不平平，其平也不平。我們墮落的人，怎麼能夠用墮落的認知功能來衡量神呢？就算我們衡量出來的神符合我們的心意，那也不可能是真神，頂多是我們墮落理性投射出來的偶像。然而，當我們查覺到自己在懷疑神的時候，我們就有機會用神的真理來檢驗我們的認知，查覺我們把神變得多小、扭曲成什麼樣子，這樣我們就能夠體會我們在多大的程度上虧缺了神的榮耀。而我們查覺自己對神的虧欠的時候，這種虧欠感可以化為我們的動力，把我們虧欠神的榮耀重新歸給祂。

第二件我們在懷疑中可以學的真理是，上帝既然大過一切，那麼祂的恩典就必勝過我們的懷疑。在以賽亞書裡面，上帝對祂的子民發出邀請：「你們來，我們彼此辯論。」上帝好像在對我們說：「我知道你們懷疑我，現在我讓你們把所有的懷疑講出來，我們彼此辯論。」然後一場辯論大賽開始了，這時全能全知的上帝採取了什麼樣的立場呢？賽一18：「耶和華說：『你們來，我們彼此辯論。你們的罪雖像硃紅，必變成雪白；雖紅如丹顏，必白如羊毛。』」上帝沒有用祂全知全能公義的審判來壓倒我們的懷疑。上帝用祂在基督裡不變的愛來勝過我們的懷疑。

使徒多馬是耶穌門徒當中的懷疑論者。他就是那個不相信耶穌復活的門徒。別的門徒告訴多馬耶穌復活了，但多馬回答說：「我非看見祂手上的釘痕，用指頭探入那釘痕，又用手探入祂的肋旁，我總不信。」過了八天，耶穌又向門徒顯現，這次多馬也在。耶穌對門徒說：「願你們平安！」然後就轉向多馬，對多馬說：「伸過你的指頭來，摸我的手；伸出你的手來，探入我的肋旁。不要疑惑，總要信。」這時候多馬的反應是什麼？ 「我的主，我的上帝！」他被耶穌降服了。

我們的神，就是這樣的神。當你懷疑祂的時候，祂就張開雙手，讓你看見祂手上的釘痕跟肋旁的傷痕。正因為這位上帝大過一切的一切，所以在祂裡面有足夠的空間來容納你我的懷疑。真正有信心的人，不是此生都不會懷疑神。真正的信心，是當我們懷疑神的時候，仍然信靠祂的恩典足以包容我們的懷疑，所以我們可以坦然無懼地帶著我們的懷疑來到祂面前，而不會因著自己的懷疑就遠離神。我們可以大膽跟神辯論。我們不要不跟神辯論，就妄自下結論說神是怎樣怎樣的神。當我們帶著懷疑來到神面前時，我們就可以看見神是多麼偉大的神。這就是為什麼基督允許多馬懷疑祂，不是嗎？

到此為止，我們說得很簡單，可是懷疑的問題有時候比單純理性上的懷疑更複雜。我們對神的懷疑，經常是出於各種痛苦的經歷。人生中的苦難，特別是一些邪惡的事情造成的苦難，會使得我們懷疑上帝是否仍掌管一切，如果是，那麼這位上帝是否是良善的神。

最近Chronicles of Narnia 第三集的電影要上映了，這部著作本來是C. S. Lewis 一系列的小說。C. S. Lewis 最著名的另一部著作是Mere Christianity。相信我們中間很多人都知道這位偉大的基督徒作家。他的著作裡面，我自己最喜歡的是A Grief Observed，中文翻譯成《卿卿如晤》。C. S. Lewis這位在Chronicles of Narnia裡面顯現出孩童般的單純信心，在Mere Christianity裡面顯出堅定的信仰的偉大信徒，在他痛失愛妻之後寫下《卿卿如晤》這本書，稱上帝為「宇宙虐待狂」──“Cosmic Sadist”。C. S. Lewis 在書中寫道：「一次又一次，當上帝顯得最恩慈的時候，祂其實是在預備下一次的虐待。」作者繼續寫道：「這是我昨晚寫下的。與其說是感想，不如說是無理取鬧的怒吼。讓我再試一次吧。相信上帝如此邪惡，合乎理性嗎？這種宇宙虐待狂、可恥的白癡？」Lewis覺得自己被神虐待了，而他這樣怒罵神，只是對神還擊而已。, and by uttering these words he commented that he was “hitting back.” (pause) Cosmic Sadist! Spiteful imbecile! 宇宙虐待狂、可恥的白癡！你能夠想像Mere Christianity 跟Chronicles of Narnia的作者筆下，能夠寫出這樣的話嗎？他自己知道這樣是不理性的，但他沒辦法。他知道自己對神的質疑不是理性上的懷疑，但這種懷疑的確是充滿人性的。他是個很真實的人，表達自己很真實的感受。

我們常常沒辦法理解上帝為什麼允許我們遭受苦難。約伯一夕之間喪失他的兒女及產業，而一直到約伯記的結尾，約伯自己以及約伯記的讀者，都還不知道上帝為什麼會允許這種可怕的事情發生在祂所愛的人身上。的確，最後上帝又賜給約伯凡事亨通的生活，但這不能解釋苦難的問題。反而，這讓上帝看起來很可笑。所以C. S. Lewis寫道：「上帝真的是這樣一個小丑嗎？這一刻把你的一碗湯打翻，就為了下一刻能夠給你另一碗一模一樣的湯？」我們常常以為約伯記的目的在於回答苦難的問題，但事實上約伯記是用最尖銳的方式提出苦難的問題，卻不把答案告訴我們。約伯的問題，是在基督耶穌裡才能找到答案的。

C. S. Lewis在痛失愛妻之後，開始指責上帝是個「宇宙虐待狂」。他說，這位上帝如此邪惡，「我們難免會說：求上帝赦免上帝」「上帝實在太壞了，祂需要得到赦免。」「但上帝沒有這樣作。祂把自己釘死在十字架上」“It was not hard to say, ‘God forgive God.’ [But] He did not… He crucified Him.” C. S. Lewis 寫到這裡的時候，就開始重新找到平安了，雖然很多事情他還是不明白。上帝把他心愛的妻子帶走，但上帝卻把自己心愛的兒子捨了，白白賜給他。

我們在苦難中間最重要的就是要定睛仰望耶穌基督的十字架，因為十字架提醒我們，我們所失去的一切，都遠不足以跟上帝為我們所捨的愛子相比，而上帝既不愛惜自己的兒子，為我們眾人捨了，豈不也把萬物和祂一同白白地賜給我們嗎？保羅在羅馬書第八章裡面就提醒我們，靠著愛我們的主，我們在一切的患難當中已經得勝有餘了，more than conquerors。這是我們的信心在苦難當中得以成長的不二法門。我不願意將苦難合理化，我絕對不會告訴你，上帝允許我們遭受苦難是為了陶造我們的品格，因為對於這樣的理論，我所能舉出的例證，絕對不會多過我能想到的反證。在蘇丹那些父母被軍隊殺掉、從小就被洗腦訓練成殺人機器的兒童士兵，他們所遭受的苦難，有讓他們成為人上之人嗎？

沒錯，有的時候有些人遭受的苦難，是可以明確看到背後有神美好的目的，但在大部份的情況底下，這世間的苦難，是看不出任何目的的。我們最不應該說的，就是某某人遭受苦難是被神懲罰。加爾文說神預定的目的是向我們隱藏的，這就意味著我們不應該用神的目的來將人們遭受的苦難給合理化。我們的信心不是建基於我們不知道的隱藏的事。我們的信心是建立在我們清楚知道的事情上，而我們清楚知道的真理就是，當神的兒女遭受苦難的時候，上帝與我們一同受苦。聖經說上帝有憐憫慈愛。希臘文的「憐憫」跟英文的sympathy是同一個字。 Syn的意思是「共同」，patheia意思是「受苦」。Sympatheia就是「一同受苦」。聖經說上帝滿有憐憫慈愛，意思是上帝在祂兒女的苦難中間與我們一同受苦。而且上帝受苦的方式，不是在天上看著我們受苦，然後在天上可憐心疼我們。不。祂與我們同受苦，意思是，我們所受的苦，祂與我們一同遭受。不能受感的上帝成為遭受苦難的人，在神性中卻仍是不能受感的神，但祂的神性與祂的人性不能分離，所以當祂來到世上受盡諸般苦難的時候，實際上是上帝親身在經歷這些苦難。就像C. S. Lewis講的，我們難免會說「上帝赦免上帝」，但上帝沒有這樣作。上帝將祂兒子釘在十字架上。It’s not hard to say, “God forgive God.” He did not. He crucified Him. 基督在十字架上受苦，這是我們確知的。這不能解釋為什麼我們今生會遭受這些苦難，會失去心愛的人，會受到各種傷害。我們也不需要將這些苦難合理化，試圖解釋這些苦難背後的目的。我們今天的講題是「與難題共存」，而人生中最大的難題，大概莫過於苦難的問題，也就是為什麼一個全能又慈愛的上帝會允許祂所愛的兒女遭受到這一切可怕的事情，為什麼上帝會創造一些人，容許他們犯罪，然後又不從地獄之火裡面把他們拯救出來。這些難題是很真實的問題，但這是我們無法理解也無法解決的問題。我們不知道上帝為什麼允許罪惡與苦難，不代表我們的信心是盲目的。與難題共存的意思是，我們不要在那些我們現在無法理解的事情上面鑽牛角尖，而是為我們確實知道的那些真理感到平安。

在《卿卿如晤》這本書的結尾，C. S. Lewis寫道：「當我把這些問題帶到神面前的時候，我沒有得到任何答案。然而這是一種很特別的『沒答案』(a rather special sort of “No answer”)。不是一道反鎖的門，更像是祂默默地看著我，祂的眼光決不是沒有憐憫的。就好像祂對我搖搖頭，不是在拒絕我，而是延遲祂的答案。似乎在對我說：『孩子啊，平靜下來吧，你現在還不明白。』」 我們雖然不明白，但我們可以有平安，因為我們知道所失去的一切都比不上天父白白為我們捨了的愛子。在苦難中的信心，不是相信上帝會讓我們吃得苦中苦、方為人上人，也不是相信上帝會用我們的苦難來成就更美好的目的，因為這些都不是必然的，神也沒有給我們這樣的應許。在苦難中的信心，就是定睛仰望主耶穌基督，知道在基督裡，上帝親自走進我們的苦難中間，與我們一同受苦。有一天，今生的苦難都會變成榮耀的冠冕，就好像我們將來在天上敬拜的羔羊，仍然帶著被殺過的釘痕，而那最痛苦卑微的釘痕，卻成為至高的榮耀。這就是今生一切苦難的永恆意義所在。

接下來我要跟各位分享信徒在挫敗中的成長。失敗是一種特殊的苦難，也是每個人或多或少都會經歷的。我們中間有多少人在求學期間拿過F的？Failed。我說了你們或許不信，我大學的時候有一段時間fail了好幾門課，然後就被放在academic probation底下。我中學的時候幾乎是全A，上了大學遭受這種挫折，心裡很難受，不敢告訴任何人。我可以想像人們臉上不屑的表情。我可以想像那些等著看我失敗的人冷眼旁觀的恥笑。最糟糕的是，我無法面對我自己。我對自己有很高的期望，我總是夢想著研究所能夠到哈佛、耶魯、普林斯頓、牛津、劍橋這些名校，而這個academic probation對我的夢想帶來嚴重的打擊。我當時完全無法想像我後來會被哈佛錄取、到牛津讀書。當時的我，只覺得這輩子完了，只想找個洞往下鑽。

我們都知道世俗智慧對於挫敗的領悟。這些很多都是合乎聖經的。這世上有智慧的人都知道，一個真正的贏家，是能夠不被挫折打敗的人。如果要贏，就必須先學會用誠實寬廣的心來面對自己的失敗，從失敗中學教訓，從失敗中站起來。美國開國元老之一的Thomas Paine曾經說過一句名言：「失敗為成功之母」。成功的人，必先學會面對失敗。這對於基督徒與非基督徒都是一樣的。Thomas Paine自己是個非基督徒。基督徒與非基督徒之間的不同在於我們對成功的定義以及我們追求卓越的目的。

我們不用說都知道，基督徒應該以榮耀神為目的。我們把最大的努力獻給神，把結果交託在祂手裡，因為我們知道不管結果如何，祂會為自己的榮耀負責。綜觀中國的宣教史，我們會發現，所謂「成功」的故事非常少，假如我們所說的「成功」是世俗之人所追求的那種成功。那些早期的宣教士，像馬禮遜這些人，在中國宣教可以說沒有什麼顯著的果效。他們都是有才華的人，獻上了他們的青春以及最大的努力，卻沒有帶領多少人信主。他們在無數的挑戰與挫敗底下堅持不懈，他們也不曉得因著他們的擺上，今天會有幾千萬的中國人成為基督的門徒。失敗為成功之母。

然而，基督徒所遭受的種種挫敗，還有一層更深的屬靈意義，也就是我們如何面對失敗所帶來的痛苦與羞愧感。我們會從別人感到壓力，也會自己給自己壓力。當一個男人失業的時候，他會覺得他對不起他的家人。一個學生成績不好，沒辦法上好的大學，可能會覺得對不起父母的栽培。家人與父母都是愛我們的，但另外有些人就等著看我們失敗，以便取笑我們、指責我們，甚至落井下石。對於我們中間比較傑出的人來說，我們害怕失敗的一個重要原因，可能是我們怕別人發現我們也只不過是人，just human after all。

有的時候別人不給我們壓力，我們卻自己給自己壓力。我們為自己設定很高的標準，對自己有很高的期待，而當我們達不到這種標準的時候，我們就會責備自己。我們會對自己失望。我們不願意承認我們自己是 just human after all。

然而這正是上帝要藉由我們的失敗來教導我們的最重要的功課：we are just human！我們不是神，我們只是人！亞當的原罪就是他不肯承認自己只是個人，他想要像神一樣分別善惡，而信心正好就是這個原罪的相反。藉由信心，我們知道自己只是人，我們不是神，我們的整個存有都依靠著上帝的恩典。我們為自己定很高的標準是好的；我們追求卓越是好的。但追求完美與完美主義中間，有一個本質的區別。完美主義者無法容忍自己的不完美。完美主義就是想要成為more than just human的那種驕傲的罪。如果是道德上的完美主義，就是聖經裡面法利賽人的那種律法主義。追求完美，與完美主義不是一個概念。基督徒追求完美，是因為他很謙卑地知道自己只是個人，知道自己很不完美，而神是完美的。他追求完美，是因為他想要與神親近，而不是因為他想要成為神。一個完美主義者很容易被失敗擊垮；但一個追求完美者，能夠平靜地面對自己的失敗，一次次從失敗中站起來，知道神不會因為他的失敗就對他失望。

當然，人生當中有很多種不同的失敗，最嚴重的就是道德上的失敗，也就是犯罪。這就是我今天要跟各位分享的最後一個主題：如何與罪共存。「Oh no！我又犯罪了！」我想，任何誠實的基督徒，心裡都會常常說這樣的話。我們追求聖潔，但我們卻一次又一次落入同樣的罪中，我們感到非常挫折。我們覺得自己是失敗的人，不配得到上帝的恩典。

然而，我們除了要學會明白我們是罪人，我們一定會犯罪一定會失敗之外，還有一件更重要的真理我們必須明白，那就是神的恩典夠用。我們的自我認識不應該只停留在「我是罪人」。我們要明白我們是蒙恩的罪人；我們要明白，不論我們的罪再怎麼大，也大不過神的恩典。我們要學會用神的眼光來看自己。

神很清楚知道我們只是人，we are just human。我們還不只是 “just human”，我們是sinful humans，我們是罪人，we are sinners。神要我們成為聖潔，但神並不要求也不期望我們今生就能夠像祂一樣。神知道我們一定會失敗，一定會跌倒，而神也從來不對我們失望。假如我們以為我們屬靈的失敗能夠使我們失去救恩，那麼我們就太小看神的恩典了。我們以為我們的罪比神的恩典更有能力。我們以為神的恩典不足以勝過我們的罪。如果你把自己的罪看得比神的恩典還要大，你就是看自己過於所當看的，這是何等驕傲！但有信心的人就知道神的恩典永遠夠用，永遠勝過我們的過犯。就像大衛王在犯了驚世駭俗的罪之後，還是帶著憂傷痛悔的心回到神面前，寫下詩篇五十一篇；他知道信實的神必定赦免他的罪。使徒彼得三次不認主，但他知道基督的恩典大過他的失敗，所以在耶穌復活後，他毫不遲疑回到耶穌身邊，甚至三次宣告他愛主耶穌，完全不以為恥，因為他知道耶穌不以他為恥。

我們應該感謝神賜給我們失敗、跌倒、犯罪的空間，因為透過我們的過犯，我們能夠更清楚認識自己是何等的罪人，而基督又是何等的恩主。這就回到我們一開始說的，有的時候我們沒有查覺我們把神看得太小了，而透過我們自己的失敗，我們能夠認識祂有多偉大，我們也可以學習信靠祂的恩典。神的恩典正是在我們的軟弱上顯得完全；我們最軟弱的時候，正是神恩典最豐盛的時候。

我現在正在翻譯一本John Owen的文集，這本書是很實際的實踐神學，專門探討基督徒怎樣與罪爭戰、怎樣追求聖潔。英文書名是Triumph Over Temptation，出版社把中文書名定為《向試探誇勝》，但我不是很喜歡這個翻譯，我現在還在想這個書名應該怎樣翻。John Owen是十七世紀清教徒裡面最具代表性的神學家，但這本書是給平信徒看的很好的靈修實踐的書，講的就是如何勝過試探。在一般華人教會當中，當我們講到成聖的時候，我們通常就會聽到一些陳腔濫調：「我們要聖潔，因為神是聖潔的；如果你繼續犯罪，就表示你還沒得救。」有一次在一個洗禮的禮拜裡面，我聽到一位牧師禱告說：「神啊，求你保守今天受洗的這些弟兄姊妹，讓他們永不跌倒，永不失腳。」我發現華人教會的傳統裡面有一種屬靈的完美主義，無法容忍靈性上的缺陷。所以當我們聽到Triumph Over Temptation這樣的書名的時候，我們可能會想：「又來了，又是一堆道德教訓。」

但我們把這本書打開來讀的時候，我們會有點訝異，因為Owen一開始就告訴讀者，我們都是罪人，我們終此一生必定屢屢犯罪，而且有些罪必定一犯再犯。歐文引用羅馬書第七章，他把罪擬人化，說罪住在我們裡面，試圖左右我們的理性、情感、意志、行為。歐文說，現在基督要來住在我們裡面，卻發現在我們裡面沒有一處祂可以安然落腳的地方，不論祂要到哪裡，都會受到我們裡面的罪的頑強抵抗。歐文還說，我們在本性上就是不喜歡、不渴望神的。作為罪人，我們的本性就是想要抵擋神。我們必定會覺得讀經、禱告、敬拜這些屬靈責任很無聊。不要假裝我們很喜歡這些東西，也不要因為我們實踐了這些責任就自我感覺良好，以為自己很敬虔。這跟法利賽人沒有兩樣。如果要勝過我們裡面的罪，我們首先就要明白罪的特性，我們要誠實面對我們裡面的罪，我們要知道這個罪有多麼頑強，我們終其一生，都無法完全消滅這個敵人。所以假如你發現有些罪是你一犯再犯，有時候好像已經勝過，但過些時候它又回來攪擾你，這時候你不要喪志，也不要灰心。罪本來就是這樣頑強的。罪的難題，是我們終其一生必須面對、必須與之共存的難題。與罪的難題共存的意思是，我們明白這個難題在今生不能夠完全解決，所以我們不會因為解決不了就灰心喪志，不去對付它。我們更要明白，我們的罪雖然這麼真實、這麼頑強，但它已經威脅不了我們了，我們已經有基督的寶血遮蓋。所以馬丁路德說，我們現在要對付的罪是真實的罪，但也是已經被打敗的罪，它的毒鉤已經被拔掉了，就好像拔了牙的老虎一樣，我們不必怕它。然而同時，與罪的難題共存的意思並不是與它和平相處。與罪的難題共存的意思是不斷與罪爭戰，就算常常失敗也不放棄。我們知道這個罪已經威脅不了我們了，所以當我們偶然被罪勝過的時候，我們可以一直站起來。

在歐文的那部文集裡面，他給了很多很實際的建議，教導我們怎樣勝過試探，而我覺得其中最精彩的一段就是他告訴讀者要定睛去看屬神的事物裡面的榮美，仔細用心去思想這些吸引人的地方。我們憑著我們罪人的本性，很難去看見屬神的事物有何榮美之處，尤其是基督的十字架。我記得幾年前Mel Gibson的電影The Passion of the Christ剛出來的時候，Blockbuster這個出租電影的商店把這部電影歸類為恐怖片。對不認識神的人來說，基督釘十字架沒有任何榮美可言，它只是一個很恐怖、很血腥、不人道、不公義的事件。所以保羅說十字架對不信的人來說是絆腳石，是愚拙。但是當我們學會用信心的雙眼來仰望十字架的時候，我們會發現這個暴力、血腥、醜陋的事件背後有最吸引人的聖潔的榮美。這種榮美可以震撼人心勝過這世間任何美好的事物，可是基督的榮美是不容易發現的，所以我們必須花時間去默想。清教徒在讀聖經的時候不只用理性去明白、去解經，他們是先用理性明白，然後用心去體會，讓經文來觸動他們的情感，來徹底地改變他們看事情的角度、他們的價值觀、他們的世界觀。這樣的讀經叫作discursive meditation。當我們被聖經所啟示的這位上帝吸引的時候，我們就會開始厭惡罪。我們的本性是喜愛罪的，所以我們很容易犯罪。成聖好像逆水行舟，不進則退，我們需要常常被神吸引，努力去發現神的榮美，在讀經、禱告、敬拜當中用心去發現上帝最吸引我們的地方，這樣子，成聖就變成一門我們甘心樂意去操練的功課了。簡而言之，成聖最重要的秘訣不是定睛在我們的罪上面，思想怎樣消滅這些罪；成聖最重要的秘訣就是定睛仰望那為我們信心創始成終的耶穌。這就意味著，我們不應該用一種完美主義的眼光來看我們的罪，然後發現我們無法容忍自己。這種屬靈的完美主義只有兩種結果，第一就是像法利賽人那樣假冒為善、自我欺騙，這種叫屬靈的阿Q精神，第二種結果就是像賣主的猶大那樣，對神的恩典絕望，對自己絕望，讓後就放棄自己。神不會放棄我們，不論我們多麼不完美。所以，我們可以很坦然地在今生一切的不完美當中追求完美。

我們的生命中總是充滿各樣的挑戰，而我們必定面臨許多的難題與挫敗。最重要的事情是，我們必須學會在失敗中成長，而不要讓失敗的經歷把我們打倒。不要定睛在自己身上，要定睛仰望神的恩典。不要給自己過高的期望，不要看自己過於所當看的，學會用神的眼光來看我們自己，我們曉得我們是神的兒女。承認我們是罪人，並不是在貶低我們自己。相反的，承認我們是罪人，就代表我們明白自己因著神的恩典而具有無限的價值。在我們懷疑的時候、遭受苦難的時候，也是一樣，我們要把神當神，我們要明白自己是神的兒女，不多也不少。換言之，我們要明白神的恩典，定睛於神的恩典，我們曉得，我們的罪不論再怎麼大，也不能大過神的恩典。所以結束的時候，我想給大家唸一段經文。林後十二9：「[主]對我說，『我的恩典夠你用的，因為我的能力是在人的軟弱上顯得完全。』所以，我更喜歡誇自己的軟弱，好叫基督的能力覆庇我。」

A friend of mine asked me whether Eve was created with Adam on the Sixth Day, as Genesis 1:27 describes, or after the Seven Days, as Genesis 2 seems to suggest. This question in itself might appear theologically irrelevant, but the implications behind this question are very important for a right understanding of the doctrine of creation and the notion of the Imago Dei, the image of God in which He created humanity.

Genesis 1 is written in a very poetic style. The literary unit (called a “pericope”) begins with 1:1 and ends with 2:3. This unit depicts in broad strokes God’s original creation in the first six days.

Genesis 1:27a and 1:27b say that God created humanity in His image. The word “humanity” or “man” is “ha-Adam“–it is both the name of the first man God created as well as the proper noun for “humanity”. In Genesis 1:27, a definite article is placed before “Adam” (“ha-Adam“), thus it is referring to humanity, albeit with reference to the specific man Adam who is the prototypical human. Note that the word “ha-Adam” does not mean “man” as in male human. Rather, “ha-Adam” means humanity in general. The word for “man,” in contradistinction to “woman,” is “ha-ish,” while the word for “male” is “zakar,” which is used in Genesis 1:27c, “male and female God created them.” Therefore, Genesis 1:27 is not about the creation of the man, the male human, but the creation of humanity, male and female. From this it is clear that God created both Adam and Eve on the Sixth Day.

Genesis 1:27b says, “in the image of God He created him.” This might give the impression that the author is referring to the man. However, the Hebrew word for “him” is just “et + masculine singular ending,” meaning that the action is performed on an object that is grammatically masculine, but the masculine ending does not necessarily indicate that the object is exclusively male. In the context of Genesis 1:27, “him” is practically gender-neutral, since it refers to “ha-Adam,” which is, again, not the male human, but humanity in general.

There are some literary nuances in Genesis 1:27a. It means both that “God created humanity in His own image” and that “God created the human in His own image”. In the former sense, it means that God created humanity in general. In the latter sense, it means that God created the man Adam to be the prototypical human, so in this sense, “ha-Adam” also refers specifically to the man Adam. Yet, God didn’t just create Adam. “Male and female He created them.” That means the creation of Eve was finished on the Sixth Day to mark the creation of a  complete humanity.

In Hebrew, a phrase is repeated with the same words in reverse order to indicate emphasis in a poetic way. Thus we see in Genesis 1:27 two phrases repeated in reverse order of words, “God created man in His own image” and “in the image of God He created him”. A third poetic phrase is employed to stress the completion of the creation of humanity: “male and female God created them”.

The term “male and female” is a Hebrew literary devise known as “merism,” whereby two juxtaposed concepts are joined together to indicate completion and wholeness. For example, “northern Egypt and southern Egypt” means “the whole land of Egypt”. Similarly, “male and female” refers to “the entirety of humanity”. This means that the creation of humanity was completed in entirety on the Sixth Day. After the Sixth Day, the continuation of the creation of humanity only comes in the form of procreation, in the category of divine providence rather than original creation.

The completion of the creation of humanity also marks the completion of God’s original creation of the universe. Genesis 1:1 begins with the merism, “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.” Now, “the heaven and the earth” is a merism that denotes the whole of creaturely existence. It means “in the beginning God created everything.” The merism denotes the completion of God’s original creation. The completion of the creation of “heaven and earth” is achieved by the creation of humanity, “male and female”. In other words, God’s original creation was not complete until God created Eve. She was God’s very last work in original creation. With the creation of Eve, not only was humanity made whole, but also the universe was made complete. (Note that no such status is given to women in the Koran, even though the Koran tells a similar creation story based on Genesis).

Now, having depicted God’s original creation in broad poetic strokes in Genesis 1:1-2:3, the author moves on to Genesis 2:4-25 and zooms in on the Sixth Day, the creation of humanity. The literary genre shifts from poetic historiography to narrative historiography. This shift in style and genre indicates that Genesis 2:4-25 is not a continuation in the narration of the events in Genesis 1:1-2:3. Genesis 1:1-2:3 and Genesis 2:4-25 are not on a continuous timeline. The events in Genesis 2:4-25 did not take place after the first Seven Days. Rather, the author first depicts the Seven Days in broad poetic strokes in Genesis 1:1-2:3, and then moves on to use a more narrative and less poetic style to explicate the events on the Sixth Day in 2:4-25.

That Genesis 2:4-25 is an expansion of Genesis 1:27 can be discerned from the structural parallels between the two passages. Genesis 1:27 says that God created humanity in His own image, and that the creation of humanity was completed by the creation of the male and the female. The part about the “image of God” in Genesis 1:27 is expanded and explicated in Genesis 2:7-17, while Genesis 2 ends with the creation of Eve as does Genesis 1:27.

In Genesis 2:7-17 we find that the man received life from God’s breath. The breath of God is associated in biblical literature with God’s Spirit. As Calvin puts it, it is the Holy Spirit who “quickens all things”. God gives life through the Holy Spirit. This is not identical to the Holy Spirit’s work of rebirth in believers today. However, there is a parallel between original creation and our new creation in Christ. In original creation, God gave life to Adam by His Spirit, and in one sense the Holy Spirit was present in Adam in a special way, though not in the same way as the Holy Spirit now indwells us to unite us to Christ. In the new creation, too, God gives us new life by the Holy Spirit, and He is ever present in the believer, who is God’s new creation. In original creation, it is through the Holy Spirit that God endows humanity with His image; in the new creation, it is also through the Holy Spirit that God gives us His image in a new way (Eph. 4:24). As we shall see, the core of the image of God in original creation is loving relationality expressed in the union of Adam and Eve, reflecting the loving relationality of the Triune God. In the new creation, too, the new Imago Dei finds its core in loving relationality, thus after having stated that the new man is re-created in the image of God in Ephesians 4:24 in the context of our union with Christ, Paul would draw an analogy between this union and the union between husband and wife in Ephesians 5:22-33. In this way, the new Imago Dei differs from the original Imago Dei in that the new creation is predicated upon our redemptive union with Christ, who is the Mediator between God and humans. Yet, there are parallels between the new Imago and the original Imago as well: both correspond to the inner-Trinitarian relations of love, truth and beauty. Thus Ephesians 4:24 associates the new Imago that God gives to born-again believers with truth, righteousness and holiness.

In original creation as depicted in Genesis 1-2, the specific implications of being endowed with God’s image is that man was able to, in the words of Bavinck and Van Til, “think God’s thoughts after Him.” Even after the fall, man is still de jure and objectively able to do this–fallen sinners still possess God’s image–but he will not because he is in the bondage of sin, and his de facto and subjective inability to do this renders him inexcusable for thinking that he is autonomous and independent of God. The Imago Dei as such means that human rationality and sensitivities are in a way analogous to God’s thought. Man has aesthetic sensitivity (Gen. 2:9) because, as Jonathan Edwards puts it, God is beautiful and God endows His creation with beauty; man has moral sensitivity (Gen. 2:9, 17) because God is holy, and man is called to know the good by knowing God and thinking God’s thought after Him.

The aesthetic and moral sensitivities as a result of humanity’s being created in God’s image is depicted in Genesis 2:8-9, 17. There God made trees that were “pleasing to the eyes”. The aesthetic aspect of the Imago Dei was not just visual, but applied to other senses as well. We are told that these beautiful trees bore fruit that were “good for food”. In 2:9 and 2:17, we also find that God gives a moral command to think God’s thought after Him in order to know and do good. There God placed the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in the Garden. The word “knowledge” comes from “yada,” a Hebrew verb meaning “to know” in the sense of “to love,” “to choose,” and “to determine”. To eat from the tree would thus be to declare that humans would autonomously determine good and evil, truth and falsity, beauty and vileness, without thinking God’s thought after God.

Even the act of eating from the tree, however, could not efface the Imago Dei, thus all humans still carry innate moral sensibilities even after the fall. For this reason the de facto and voluntary inevitability for all fallen humans to sin is “without excuse” (see Rom. 1:19-20; 2:12-15). The image of God is such that it makes humans aesthetic and moral beings in His likeness, both before and after the fall.

Then, from 2:15 we also learn that man carries God’s image by possessing governing and working sensitivities. God commands man to govern His creation and be His regent on earth as He is King in heaven; God acts and works, so He commands man to work. This governing and working sensitivity in the Imago Dei also entails rationality: in Genesis 2:19-20 God commands man to study His creation in order to govern it. Adam’s knowledge of God and of all His creation was rational, because God is ultimately rational, and by the Imago Dei endowed to him, Adam thought God’s thoughts after Him.

After the fall, human beings are still rational in one sense, but irrational in another sense. Fallen humans are rational in the sense that they still possess the power to reason, since they are still endowed with God’s image. However, humans have become irrational in the sense that they have fallen into the contradiction of “autonomous reason”. Human reason can never be autonomous; rational autonomy is both an illusion and a reality. It is an illusion because human reason can never escape from God; it is a reality because it refuses to submit to God. In a word, fallen humans have become irrational, because sinners no longer think God’s thought after Him. Even then, we must stress that even fallen humans are rational beings because they are made in God’s image and endowed with the power to reason. This very power to reason, this Imago Dei, renders the irrationality and futility of fallen human thinking inexcusable.

Finally, the Imago Dei involves relationality. God is eternally relational, existing in the loving relations of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Thus God endows humanity with His image of relationality by finally creating the woman in Genesis 2:20b-25. The creation of humanity in God’s image was not complete until God made Eve to be Adam’s wife. The divine endowment of God’s image to humanity was not complete until God created Eve.

Even fallen humans have an intrinsic need for relationships, because we are made in God’s relational image. Yet, since the fall, all relationships in the world have gone wrong. Relationship between God and humans was broken; Adam and Eve began to hide from God. The “bone of my bones” became “that woman”. Relational immediacy expressed in the naked body (Gen. 2:25) was hindered by sin (Gen. 3:7). In a word, relationships in the fallen world are all broken. Even then, however, human beings are still innately relational, because we are made in the relational image of the Triune God. The Imago Dei was never effaced by the fall of Adam, thus in this fallen world we long for love and right relationships. The relationality of the Imago Dei in original creation was expressed when God made humanity in His image, “male and female He made them.”

The image of God in man was completed when Eve was made. Without Eve, all the other sensitivities in the Imago Dei were only partial. Adam could not wholly fulfil the mandate to work and govern the earth with rationality, morality and sense of beauty on his own–he needed a “helper” (Gen. 2:20b). The word “helper” comes from the Hebrew word, “ezer“. The same word is used when the Bible says that God is our “help”. Thus “helper” is not to be misunderstood as “servant”. Rather, to “help” means to complement one’s weaknesses or insufficiencies. That we are told the man needed a helper means that the man was not complete on his own–everything else in creation was already very good (tov me’od!) but it was not good for Adam to be alone. By no means does the word “helper” imply that the wife is subordinate or subservient to the husband, though we are told that according to this order of creation the wife is to submit to the husband–this would pertain to another discussion. Anyway, only with the creation of Eve was the creation of humanity complete. The universe was never whole until the woman was made. Only then was the image of God fully endowed to the human being. Only then was God’s work of original creation complete. Only then did God enter into the Sabbath.

From this we can also see that Genesis 1:27c is linked with the first two phrases in the same verse. The “image of God” in Genesis 1:27a and 1:27b finds its expression in “male and female” in 1:27c. In this sense, the significance of “male and female” with reference to God’s image is not so much the importance of holy matrimony, but rather human relationality that is analogous to the Triune God. More concretely, this relationality is a relation of love. We find, then, that love–agape–lies at the very core of the Imago Dei. The Bible tells us, “We love, because God first loved us” (1 Jn. 4:9). This underpins the meaning of the image of God.

After the fall, our love is just as broken as our relationships, but, once again, the Imago Dei was never effaced by the fall. Thus the Imago Dei renders us inexcusable for not loving God and our neighbours the way the Law commands us. Yet, by the Holy Spirit, God has given us a new Imago Dei, that of our new creation in Christ: “Everyone who loves has been born of God and knows God. Whoever does not love does not know God, because God is love. This is how God showed His love among us: He sent His one and only Son into the world that we might live through Him. This is love: not that we loved God, but that He loved us and sent His Son as an atoning sacrifice for our sins. Dear friends, since God so loved us, we also ought to love one another. No one has ever seen God; but if we love one another, God lives in us and His love is made complete in us. We know that we live in Him and He in us, because He has given us of His Spirit. And we have seen and testify that the Father has sent His Son to be the Saviour of the world. If anyone acknowledges that Jesus is the Son of God, God lives in him and he in God. And so we know and rely on the love God has for us. God is love. Whoever lives in love lives in God, and God in him” (1 Jn. 4:7-16).

This passage from 1 John underpins the meaning of the Imago Dei: to love God’s love after God–”not that we loved God, but that He loved us… we love because God first loved us”. This passage also tells us that the Spirit gives to us a new Imago Dei by uniting us to the Son. Anyone who believes in Jesus as God’s Son possesses this new Imago, and he is once again able to “love God’s love after Him”. What the original Imago can no longer do after the fall, God now gives us a new Imago, the image of His Son, by the Holy Spirit, so that we may love God’s love after Him.

In this way, we see that the new Imago does not abolish or replace the old. Rather, the new Imago completes the old, just as the gospel fulfils and completes the Law. From this we also see that when God created humanity in His image, male and female, the Genesis narrative was already pointing to Jesus Christ.  That God completed His original creation on the Sixth Day and entered into rest on the Seventh means that He shall finish the work of salvation and restore our Imago Dei before our everlasting rest with Him.

From the foregoing discussions we can see that the creation of Eve must reside in the Sixth Day, and not after the Seven Days. Otherwise, God’s original creation would have been incomplete until after the Seven Days (unless one thinks that humanity is complete without the female, that is, without the image of God’s loving relationality); humanity’s image of God would have been incomplete on the Sixth Day; the Sabbath would then have been a day of sloth rather than a day of true rest on God’s part. God rested, because His work of original creation was done. Even though we have fallen into sin and God’s work of redemption is yet to be finished, we can still find rest in God to-day, because we know that He shall sure see to it that He gets the work done before He goes to rest.

God created us in His own image, and, as we have seen, the Imago Dei of the original creation now renders us inexcusable for our immorality, vileness, irrationality, and broken relationships. Yet, the same God who created us in His image has created us again in Jesus Christ, whose incarnate work of mediation is the new Imago Dei. We receive from God new life and this new Imago Dei in Christ by the Holy Spirit, so that the original Imago may be renewed, restored, and consummated. It is this God whom we praise. He is our Triune Creator, and we are made in His image, not once, but twice. His work is finished, and He sure shall finish His work. Praise Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

———————————

As an aside, some Chinese Christians have recently jettisoned a millennia-long Christological orthodoxy handed down from Chalcedon, claiming that Jesus Christ’s humanity is eternal and uncreated, serving as the prototype of humanity and the image of God in which Adam was made. I will not go into the details of why this theory would finally lead to an abandonment of the entire doctrine of salvation taught by the Church since Chalcedon, especially by the Reformation. Suffice it to say here that this theory completely neglects the exegetical details I have provided above on the biblical doctrine of the image of God, confusing the Imago Dei of the original creation with that of the new creation. It also confuses our union with Christ as His work of mediation with His human nature that He assumed in His divine Person upon the incarnation (i.e., this theory confuses Christ’s work with His Person), which was “for us and for our salvation,” as Nicea and Chalcedon put it. The assumptio of human nature whereof Nicene-Chalcedonian orthodoxy and Reformation theology speaks, along with Catholicism, is such that Christ’s human nature is not eternal nor is it inherent to His Person, but rather He assumed it (that is, He took on human nature) in His one divine Person in order to accomplish our salvation from sin. The theory that Christ’s humanity is the uncreated image of God in which Adam was created is both dogmatically and exegetically under-informed and unsound. The Christian leader to whom this theory is attributed only proposed it as a possibility, and it is a possibility that troubles him. Yet, his followers have turned it into a new orthodoxy, jettisoning the entire Nicene-Chalcedonian as well as Reformed orthodoxy, and a lot of them even think that Christ’s “uncreated humanity” is what Reformed theology has always taught! They do not realise that the theory of Christ’s “uncreated humanity” so troubles the leader whom they think they are following, precisely because their leader, who is really my leader and not theirs because they fail to do him justice and are on the brink of turning him into a heretic, knows that this theory is against the universally acknowledged orthodoxy of the Church. This leader is still troubled by the exegetical possibility that Christ’s humanity is uncreated, because he has not yet found the the Church’s orthodoxy convincing. More precisely, he has not read enough about the Church’s decision against such a theory. As a great man whom I most admire, he has humbly asked me to assemble dogmatic materials from Chalcedon onwards to show him why the Church’s orthodoxy has always and universally insisted that Christ’s humanity is created, and why those who even hinted that there is an uncreated aspect to Christ’s humanity, such as Apollinaris and Meister Eckhart, have found their theories condemned as heresies by the Church. I hope those who follow him would learn from his humility and learn from what the Church has been saying since Chalcedon, otherwise their ignorance could posthumously turn this great man into a heretic–he is not!

—————————————–

Hey Alex,

Just today, we had a guest lecturer for my course in modal logic. The lecturer was Prof. N, who is very well known. I found his lecture today extremely interesting as he was attempting to defend a modal logical system called S7.

Basically, the axiom that distinguishes this system is that every statement is “possibly possible”. For example, the Law of Non-contradiction is possibly possible to be false, or contradictory statements are possibly possible to be true. Prof. N notes, however, that the Law of Non-Contradiction is still NECESSARILY true, and contradictions are NECESSARILY false.

What the logic of S7 implies is that although necessary truths and falsehoods still exist, they are still debatable. Prof. N illustrates his point with the concepts of geometry. Indeed, many of the axioms of euclidean geometry are necessarily true; yet, we see mathematicians questioning the necessary truths of euclidean geometry. No doubt, there have been a number of geometrical systems that have sprung up that are incompatible with euclidean geometry, but still useful in their own right.

However, what caught my eye during the presentation was an illustration the professor used regarding the laws of transitivity. Many people would agree that it is a necessary truth that if two things are equal to another thing, then they are equal to each other. Prof. N agrees that this is a necessary truth, but he also argues that it is possibly possible that it is false. To illustrate this point, he mentions the Council of Nicea and the Holy Trinity.

There is something strangely attractive about this logic because it does not abolish all necessary truths and lead us down relativist alleyways; yet, it does not assert that those necessary truths of logic are unquestionable.

To me, I found the existence of such a logic to be quite startling. For a long time, I thought logicians have equated “Truth” with logical truth, and those statements that are illogical or paradoxical would be considered meaningless. This professor, however, seemed to express the opinion that there are many so called “impossibilities” that are possibly true, and that we should explore the possibility of these “impossibilities”.

I found that idea to be quite encouraging as I thought that to accept the paradox of the Trinity, or the paradox of the God-Man duality of Jesus was to alienate myself from all meaningful discourse in analytic philosophy and banish me into the realms of theology.

Because I always thought that any meaningful discourse about God can only take place in a theological context, I seriously doubted that there was any merit in pursuing analytic philosophy. But now that I seem to have stumbled upon a logic of analytic philosophy that not only permits one to talk about the impossible, but encourages one to do so, I find my opinion changing.

What do you think of this logic? Do you think that meaningful discourse about God can take place in an analytic context, or should I just heed Wittgenstein’s advice and “remain silent whereof one cannot speak”

—————————————–

Hey Frank,

Before I proceed, let me first qualify that I have to know more about Prof. N’s entire philosophical outlook to be able to comment on his thought, since one particular idea must be understood in light of the whole body of ideas if it is to be truly understood.

With this delimitation, I’d begin by saying that I think the particular idea of the “possible possibility” in the modal logical system called S7 is possibly possible. It depends on how the particular idea is used and fitted into a larger body of thought, for I think ideas of logic can never be detached from ontological truths, and the use of logical tools can never be independent of worldview presuppositions. To me, the logic of “possible possibility” can be appropriated for Christian use and interpreted in light of Christian faith, given that it is used with Christian presuppositions.

What appeals to me about S7 is that it seems to distinguish between the subjective and objective sides of truth. For instance, it recognizes geometric theorems as necessarily true in itself, but such objective truths would become debatable when they enter into subjective human minds. If I am right about this distinction between the objective and subjective sides of truth in S7, then I think it comes very close to Van Til’s epistemology. Van Til emphasise that because of the noetic effects of sin, objective truths–though they are necessarily true in themselves–would sometimes appear self-contradictory or debatable to subjective human reason and perception.

Now let’s go back to the discussion on S7. If the notion of “impossibility” in S7 can be reinterpreted in a Van Tilian way in light of the foregoing excursus, then we can understand it as “paradox”. The Trinity and the incarnation are such paradoxes to subjective fallen human reason. In this way, I think S7 may be appropriated for Christian use.

Another thing that intrigues me about S7 is that it seems to have its roots from outside of the Analytic tradition, and that Analytic Philosophy seems to be merely the context in which Prof. N seeks to express his ideas that don’t really belong to Analytic Philosophy.

I am talking about Kierkegaard. The foregoing discussions on objectivity and subjectivity already alluded to his thought. The language of “possible possibility” also sounds very Kierkegaardian. In Kierkegaard’s Sickness Unto Death (1849), the pseudonymous author Anti-Climacus identifies “the decisive thing” for “true hope and true despair” as the biblical axiom “that for God all things are possible.” On the basis of this axiom, he writes: “the decisive affirmation comes only when a man is brought to the utmost extremity, so that humanly speaking no possibility exists. Then the question is whether he will believe that for God all things are possible—that is to say, whether he will believe.”

Anti-Climacus states: “Sometimes the inventiveness of a human imagination suffices to procure possibility, but in the last resort, that is, when the point is to believe, the only help is this, that for God all things are possible.” Similarly, “salvation is humanly speaking the most impossible thing of all; but for God all things are possible! This is the fight of faith, which fights madly for possibility.”

In Kierkegaard’s writings, Anti-Climacus’ take on the notion of possibility is complementary to that of Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard’s other pseudonym, set forth in Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846). The short section on possibility bears the long title, “The dialectical contradiction that what is historical here is not something plainly historical but formed of what can be historical only against its nature, accordingly on the strength of the absurd.” In this title Climacus is referring to the paradox of the incarnation: “the historical is that the god, the eternal, has come about at a definite moment in time as a particular human being. The special feature of the historical in this case, that it is not something plainly historical but something that can have become historical only against its own nature, has ushered speculation into a delightful illusion.” The incarnation is thus an “absolute paradox”.

Asserting that the absolute paradox cannot be directly understood by human reason, Climacus proceeds to discuss the notion of “possibility.” Note that unlike Anti-Climacus who talks about “impossibilities” in terms of human limitations and “possibilities” in terms of divine omnipotence (“for God all things are possible”), when Climacus uses the word “possibility,” he is always referring to what humans can do within the limitations of human capabilities. Climacus writes: “Actuality, i.e., the fact that this or that has actually occurred, is the object of faith and yet is surely not any human being’s or humankind’s own thoughts, for thought is at most possibility, while possibility as understanding is precisely the understanding by which the step backwards is taken in which faith comes to an end.” Climacus explains that “Christianity is the absolute paradox… precisely because it destroys a possibility (the analogy of paganism, an eternal god-becoming) as an illusion and turns it into actuality, and just this is the paradox…, which, just by being actuality, turns the apparent into a deception.”

For Kierkegaard, Paganism is a possibility of human imagination, in which “God can very well be fused with man.” Yet, this possibility–which Karl Barth in the Second Edition of the Epistle to the Romans (Romans II) would call the “supreme possibility” of humankind–is destroyed by the actuality of the absolute paradox, namely, that the incarnation “should occur in actuality with an individual human being.” In a word, for Climacus (as well as the Barth of Romans II), faith in the paradox of Christianity is not within the category of human possibility. Barth would combine Climacus’ insight with that of Anti-Climacus, and say that faith and revelation are impossible in this world, but God almighty makes them possible. Even then, says Barth, faith and revelation remain “impossible possibilities” in this fallen world.

Kierkegaard’s discourses on “impossibility” and “possibility” are in fact central to Barth’s dialectic in Romans II. For Barth, knowledge of God through Christ is humanly (i.e., subjectively) impossible, and it is only because all things are possible with God that faith becomes an “impossible possibility” for human beings. Barth’s emphasis, however, is on the “impossible”–God has made revelation and faith possible in this world but they shall remain ever impossible such that humanity can never have true or constant possession of God’s self-revelation in this world of time and history. This dialectic of an “impossible possibility” undergirds Barth’s entire Romans II.

I don’t know if Prof. N ever read Kierkegaard or Barth at all. Some of his language, ideas and examples sound strikingly similar to these thinkers, and I think he is at least influenced by Kierkegaard to a large extent.

That means we have to be careful when we adopt Prof. N’s logic and language. We must not go down the road that Neo-Orthodox theologians have once trodden. Even Barth himself dropped the language of “impossible possibility” two years after the publication of Romans II, when he picked up the doctrine of the Holy Spirit’s works in Reformed orthodoxy. Barth found that the Holy Spirit can work in the believer’s heart to create faith, and thus subjective human receptivity of God’s objective revelation in Christ becomes a reality rather than an impossible possibility. The pathetic thing about Barth (during the 1920s and all through his career) is that he did not carry through with his Pneumatological insight. Under Kant’s shadow, Barth still insisted that revelation cannot be given to humans as constant possessions, thus rejecting the doctrine of the plenary inspiration of Scripture. We must ask Barth, If he believes that the Holy Spirit really creates faith in the believer in the here-and-now, how is it that he would not allow the same Holy Spirit to inspire prophets and apostles to verbally write down God’s Word so that the Word is given to the Church once and for all in the here-and-now? And if Barth believes that the historicity of the incarnation is permanent, how is it that the Holy Spirit’s work in the here-and-now cannot also be permanent?

Now I have ventured a bit too far off our topic. I am only issuing the caveat that Prof. N’s basic ideas have already been adopted by theologians in the past. In the case of Barth, these ideas have failed miserably: without the doctrine of inerrant verbal plenary inspiration Barth was never able to “laugh in the face of Feuerbach” as he once vowed to (something you’ve heard from me numerous times). Yet, I think Prof. N’s basic ideas can also be appropriated in a Van Tilian way.

The second caveat is that if we are to remain truly Christian in using Prof. N’s basic ideas, then we have to be very careful about his suggestion that “we should explore the possibility of these ‘impossibilities,’” as you put it.

From the Christian standpoint, the Trinity and the incarnation are our axiomatic presuppositions. We cannot deduce a priori whether they are possible or not. These truths are the starting point of our quest for knowledge; they are not the goal of this quest. Thus, we have to be very careful about what it means to “explore” the “possibility” of our worldview presuppositions. If by “explore” we mean to prove by deduction or induction, we would commit the fallacy of what Heidegger calls onto-theology once more. Our project must not be a metaphysical exploration in the sense of deducing the possibility of Christian truths from First Principles. We can only “explore” the worldview implications of the fundamental truths of Christianity, much like the way mathematicians explore their geometric axioms by using the axioms to deduce or prove their theorems.

This leads to your question, Is a truly Christian philosophy possible at all? Does philosophy not have to find its starting point on neutral grounds, in universally acknowledged truths, in First Principles? Well, I think such an understanding of philosophy is certainly outdated. Postmodernism (to use a very general and imprecise term) has its merits in showing that there is no such thing as “neutrality” in this world. Existentialism tells us pretty much the same thing as well with its discourse on “subjectivity”. From a Van Tilian standpoint, there is no “neutrality” in this world because we are all sinners. Our reason is either redeemed or unredeemed. We either think God’s thoughts after God, or we follow our intellectual idols. Everyone person holds to a set of worldview presuppositions. Now, in our so-called “postmodern” age, it is no longer considered a fallacy to find one’s starting point in certain presuppositions. Quite the contrary, the claim of neutrality is often considered intellectually dishonest in this day and age. A philosopher does not have to and indeed cannot start from neutral grounds without presuppositions. Thus, in this day and age, you would be able to expressly hold to a Christian worldview and still be considered a true philosopher.

What is the task of a Christian philosophy, then, if it is to be distinguished from theology? I think philosophy should be the handmaid of theology. Theology is to explicate the contents of revelation and formulate doctrines; philosophy is to find its starting point in these doctrines and “explore” a whole range of implications. For example, what are the implications of the doctrine of justification for a truly Christian epistemology? What does the biblical doctrine of creation tell us about political ethics? I think such are the questions to be explored by truly Christian philosophers.

One final caveat: we must not use Prof. N’s idea of “possibility” as the pagan notion of probability. Classical apologetics has ended up in a situation in which they can only show that God’s existence is highly probable. When Eve was in the Garden, she also saw God’s Word as a possibility that was more probable than the serpent’s words. That was an act of practical atheism: Eve placed herself above both God and the serpent to judge which was right, and she came up with her own verdict.

If “possibility” is understood in this way, then a philosophy seeking to demonstrate the “possibility” of Christian truths can never be truly Christian. If the word “possibility” is only meant to describe the subjective uncertainty of (fallen) human reason, which I think is what Prof. N is doing, then it is fine. However, this word can still be very misleading, and I would be very careful in using this terminology. I would never say to an unbeliever, “Look, Christianity is a possibility. Let’s now explore this possibility.” I would say instead, “Look, your non-Christian worldview, be whatever it may, is a possibility. Let me now show you how absurd this possibility is–not just how improbable it is but how qualitatively impossible it is.” Then I would say to the unbeliever, “Now, I find my starting point in the biblical worldview with certainty. Look what I’ve discovered about this world in which and over which Christ is Lord forever!” This, I think, is the task of Christian apologetics, which goes hand in hand with Christian philosophy.

有位讀者回應了我的上一篇關於自由戀愛的文章，提出了一個問題：以斯拉和以色列人離棄他們的異教配偶是否正確（見以斯拉記9～10章）？以下我將說明：（1）根據律法，和異族通婚確實是罪；（2）律法從未要求猶太人離棄異教配偶；（3）以斯拉和上帝立約，製造出上帝啟示之外的宗教條例，這一行為是法利賽人律法主義的根源。

在以斯拉記9～10章中，作者以旁白方式明確指出，猶太人和異族通婚是罪（如以斯拉記10：19）。而且，以斯拉在他的講話中引用了出埃及記7：3（見以斯拉記9：12），表明禁止與異族通婚不是人為捏造，而確實是出於上帝的律法。在以斯拉記第9章的開頭，清楚說明那一時期盛行的異族通婚不是發生在猶太民族和外族之間，而是猶太教徒和異教徒之間。的確，此類的異族通婚在新約（參見哥林多後書6：14）和舊約中都是罪。

我們必須清楚：猶太民族和外族人之間的異族通婚從未被禁止。路得和喇合都是外族人，上帝也在救恩歷史中使用她們作為恩典的器皿。觸犯上帝律法的是與異教徒通婚。如果說在出埃及記中僅僅是隱約表達了這個意思，那麼在士師記3：6中引用出埃及記7：3的經文，則表達得更加明顯：以色列人犯罪，不是因為他們嫁娶了外族的男女，而是因為他們與異教通婚，“並侍奉他們的神”。同樣的情形發生在以斯拉時代，因此以斯拉訴諸於上帝的律法，以禁止與異教通婚，同時代表他的百姓向上帝悔改。到目前為止，一切都很好。

問題在於以斯拉想要和上帝立約（10：3）。而這個主動與上帝立約的動機恰恰是完全出於異教。上帝是立約的主；上帝和人類立約。上帝採取主動。上帝決定立約的條款。假使以斯拉是先知，上帝也許會通過他給出祂的約；以斯拉或許得以先知性地宣告上帝和以色列的約。但事實並非如此，以斯拉不是先知！以斯拉是祭司！先知發聲，是從上到下，從神到人；祭司發聲，則是從下到上，從人到神。以斯拉最多是作為文士，宣告神已經通過先知給出的律法，但他本身從來就不是先知（見尼希米記8章）。當上帝沒有主動立約的時候，以斯拉越權主動和上帝立約。決定此約條款的不是上帝，而是以斯拉。因此，此約註定錯誤。

那麼就條款內容而言，此約的錯誤何在？的確，根據上帝的律法，與異教通婚是罪。但是上帝的律法是否要求猶太人離棄他們的異教配偶？聖經中從來沒有這樣的要求！當然，休掉異教妻子也沒有違反律法。出埃及記24：1說，如果發現妻子有不潔的事，人可以休妻；這裏不潔的事當然包括拜偶像在內。然而，律法對此類離棄僅僅是允許；律法並未要求甚或贊同！

律法從未要求猶太人離棄異教配偶，儘管在某些情況下這種離棄可能是討神喜悅的。然而，以斯拉在這裏製造出一個出於自己而不是出於上帝的約，要求猶太人離棄他們的異教配偶。他認為自己是敬畏神的。是的，敬畏神是討神喜悅的；但是過分的畏懼和過度的反應是得罪神。以斯拉所做的本質上和夏娃所做的相同：上帝僅僅是說，“不可吃”，但是夏娃自己給上帝的話加上了一個要求，“不可吃，也不可摸”。那不是聖潔；那是褻瀆。是律法主義。是倚靠自己而非倚靠神。

關於以斯拉人為之約的論述還可補充一些內容。此約的詳細內容可在尼希米記第10章中找到，該章以一句話結束：“這樣，我們就不離棄我們神的殿”。褻瀆！他們不是祈求上帝不要離棄自己，而是發誓不離棄上帝！這本當是上帝的臺詞，正如祂曾對約書亞說，“我必不撇下你，也不丟棄你”（約書亞記1：5）。約書亞所有該做的和可做的就是仰賴上帝可靠的恩典。而以斯拉時代中這些放肆的原始法利賽人，他們僭取了上帝的聲音，“仁慈地”對神說，“我們不離棄祢”！

在所有的認罪行為之後，他們並未表現出對罪本質的理解。他們表現出的，是對恩典真意的完全忽視。他們不明白上帝恩典的主權和主權的恩典；他們不明白自己不過是罪人，需要仰賴上帝的恩典，才不致墮落。他們沒有把上帝的律法看成討神喜悅的完備指南，而代之以自己的聲音，“我們又為自己定例來討你喜悅”（參見尼希米記10：32）。這不就是創世記第3章的重現！

是的，這就是律法主義猶太教——所謂“第二聖殿猶太教”——時期的開始。以斯拉此處所做的——僅僅是這位在其他方面堪稱神偉大僕人的一個小小敗筆——成為了法利賽主義的根源。

現在，如果你看以斯拉記第10章（本書作者是什麼人並不影響這個問題，因為關鍵在於內容是受聖靈所默示），作者——聖靈——從來沒有讚賞以斯拉和他百姓與上帝的立約。作者也沒有在此說上帝悅納這個人造的約。書中沒有說上帝喜悅猶太人離棄他們的異教配偶。整本聖經也沒有告訴我們，上帝因這些人的離婚而赦免他們。

你不能通過主動和上帝立約而得到赦免。你甚至不能通過遵守祂的約而買到神的恩典。你之所以不能，是因為你是一個全然墮落的罪人。你永不可對上帝說，“我將永不離開你，也不離棄你。”相反，你應該對祂說：”我深知道心易放蕩，遠離父家慕虛華。” 然後再求祂：“今獻身心求加印記，永作主民在父家。” 因為你只能信靠耶穌基督，祂一次並永遠地成為你的義，你的罪歸為祂的罪。只有在祂裏面靠著祂，你才能蒙神喜悅。只有當你通過聖靈與祂聯合，你才能確信上帝永不撇下你，也不丟棄你。定睛仰望耶穌，不要注視自己。

In Ezra 9-10, the author clearly indicates in the authorial voice that intermarriage between the Jews and pagans was a sin (e.g. see Ezra 10:19). Moreover, in his speech Ezra cites Deuteronomy 7:3 (see Ezra 9:12), showing that the ban on intermarriage was not artificially invented, but was indeed God’s Law. At the beginning of Ezra 9, it is stated explicitly that the intermarriage prevalent during that period was not between Jews and Gentiles, but between Jews and PAGANS. Indeed, such intermarriage would be a sin both in the Old Testament and the New Testament (Cf. 2 Corinthians 6:14).

We have to be clear: intermarriage between Jews and Gentiles was never forbidden. Ruth and Rahab were both Gentiles, and God used them both as vessels of mercy in the history of salvation. It is marriage with Pagans that violated God’s Law. If this is only implicit in Deuteronomy, then Judges 3:6, using the wording of Deuteronomy 7:3, makes it very clear that the Israelites were sinful not because they married gentile men and women, but because they married pagans “and served their gods”. The same situation was occurring in Ezra’s time, and so Ezra invoked God’s Law to ban intermarriage with pagans, while at the same time offering up repentance to God on behalf of his people. Up to this point, everything is good.

What went wrong was Ezra’s proposal to make a covenant with God (10:3). The very move of taking the initiative to make a covenant with God was completely pagan in itself. God is the Lord of the Covenant; God makes His covenants with men and women. God takes the initiative. God sets the terms of the Covenant. Were Ezra a prophet, God might have given His covenant through him; Ezra might have prophetically proclaimed God’s covenant to Israel. But no, Ezra was no prophet! Ezra was a priest! A prophet speaks with a voice from up above to down below, from God to men; a priest speaks with a voice from down below to up above, from men to God. Ezra was at best a scribe who proclaimed a Law that had already been given through the prophets, but he was himself never the prophet (see Nehemiah 8). Ezra went out of his place and made a covenant with God, when God did not take the initiative to make that covenant. God did not set the terms of that covenant; Ezra did. Therefore, this covenant was doomed to go wrong.

So what went wrong with the covenant, in terms of its content? Well, yes, intermarriage with pagans is a sin according to God’s Law. But did God’s Law require the Jews to divorces their pagan spouses? Such a requirement is nowhere to be found in the Bible! Of course, divorcing pagan wives was not against the Law either. Deuteronomy 24:1 says that a man is allowed to divorce his wife if he finds in her anything unclean, and sure that would include idolatry. Yet, the Law only PERMITS such a divorce; the Law does not REQUIRE or even ENDORSE it!

The Law never required Jews to divorce pagan spouses, though in particular cases such a divorce might have pleased God. Yet, here is Ezra, conjuring up a covenant of his own that did not come from God, requiring the Jews to divorce their pagan spouses. He thought he feared God.  Yes, the fear of the Lord pleases God; but unduly fear and over-reaction are sinful. What Ezra did was essentially the same as what Eve had done: God only said, “Do not eat,” but Eve added one requirement to God’s Word, “Do not eat, and do not touch”. That is not holiness; that is blasphemy. That is legalism. That is to rely on oneself rather than relying on God.

One more thought might be appended to this discourse on Ezra’s man-made covenant. The detailed content of this covenant can be found in Nehemiah 10, which ends with the phrase, “We will not forsake the house of our God.” Blasphemy! Instead of asking God never to forsake them, they vow never to forsake God! This was supposed to be God’s line, just as He once said to Joshua, “I will never leave you nor forsake you” (Joshua 1:5). All Joshua had to and was allowed to do was to rely on God’s unfailing grace. Yet these presumptuous proto-Pharisees in Ezra’s time–they assumed the voice of God and “graciously” said to God, “We will not forsake you”!

After all the confessions of their sins, they showed no understanding of the essence of sin. They showed complete ignorance of the meaning of grace. They failed to know God as the graciously sovereign and sovereignly gracious God; they failed to know themselves as sinners who could only rely on God’s grace to prevent them from falling away. Instead of trusting in God’s Law as their fully sufficient guide to pleasing God, they said to God, “We made ordinances for ourselves to please you” (Cf. Nehemiah 10:32). This is Genesis 3 all over again!

And yes, this was the period in which legalistic Judaism–so-called “Second Temple Judaism”–began. What Ezra did here–just a minor blunder in the life of an otherwise great servant of God–became the very seed of Pharisaism.

Now, if you look at the text of Ezra 10 (the human authorship is of no concern for this particular matter, as the crucial point is that this text is inspired by the Holy Spirit), the Author–the Holy Spirit–never did once praise the covenant that Ezra and his people had made with God. Never once does the Author say in Ezra 10 that God was pleased with the man-made covenant. Never once does this text say that God was delighted when the Jews divorced their pagan spouses. Never once does the Bible tell us that God had forgiven these people because of the divorce.

You don’t gain forgiveness by making a covenant with God. You can’t even purchase God’s grace by keeping His Covenant. You can’t, because you are a sinner, totally depraved. You must never say to God, “I will never leave you nor forsake you.” Instead you should say to Him, “Prone to wander, Lord, I feel it, prone to leave the God I love.” And then you can beg Him, “Here’s my heart, O take and seal it, seal it for the courts above.” For you can only trust in Jesus Christ who once and for all became your righteousness as you became His sin. He is the One who kept the Covenant for you and in you, as you were chosen in Him. Only in Him and through Him can you ever become pleasing to God. Only as you are united to Him by the Holy Spirit can you have assurance that God will never leave you nor forsake you. Fix your eyes on Jesus, not yourself.

先從第二、三點談起。所謂「聖經時代」指的是什麼？如果指的是猶太人被擄之後又歸回耶路撒冷開始的那個時代，那麼的確，當時文化相當歧視「自由戀愛」。但我們必須明白這時代的背景。這個時代，猶太人從被擄的經歷中學到了教訓，不敢再違背神的律法，但他們過猶不及，於是有了法利賽式的律法主義。許多事情是律法並未禁止的，但到了這個時期，都被猶太人自己定的律法禁止。譬如，被擄之前，猶太人與外邦人通婚，本無律法禁止，而且非常普遍，只要娶來的外邦人願意歸信耶和華，都可蒙神喜悅。亞哈娶耶洗別遭神厭惡，不是因為耶洗別是外邦人，而是因為她拜巴力、不敬畏耶和華。但敬畏耶和華的外邦人，如喇合、路得，不但蒙神喜悅，嫁入以色列，甚至成為大衛的先祖。然而，到了被擄歸回的時期，以色列人自定律法，不允許猶太人與外邦人通婚，因此撒馬利亞人遭到猶太人的歧視。撒馬利亞人是猶太人與外邦人通婚後的混血族群，他們也是敬畏耶和華的，但只因他們不是純種猶太人，就被猶太人視為不潔淨。耶穌在井邊與撒馬利亞婦人談話，等於是賞了猶太人兩個耳光，駁斥了他們的律法主義。

綜觀聖經歷史，所謂「聖經時代沒有自由戀愛」，也只適用於這個被擄歸回之後的時代。在此之前，雅各與拉結、路得與波阿斯，都是自由戀愛，並未遭到責難。雖然從亞伯拉罕開始，由父母安排婚姻乃是常態 (譬如以撒跟利百加)，但聖經律法從未禁止過自由戀愛。

再論「自由戀愛」與文藝復興的關係。事實是，自由戀愛在中世紀已經很普遍，從遊唱詩人的歌曲中就可見得。此外，中世紀文學大多以宮廷及宗教為題材，其中也不乏自由戀愛的故事。有一位反對自由戀愛的神學導師說，自由戀愛「都是莎翁惹的禍」，這是錯的。莎士比亞只不過將戲劇文學平民化，使之雅俗共賞。在中世紀，可登大雅之堂的文學都以宮廷及教會為題材；平民文學是不登大雅之堂的。文藝復興之後，平民的愛情故事也成為了經典文學。但不論中世紀或文藝復興，自由戀愛的故事都為人津津樂道，儘管父母指定的婚姻仍是社會常態。這就說明，自由戀愛並非人類新時代的新發明。且不論中世紀，早在舊約時代，自由戀愛就已存在，而且可以蒙神喜悅。

最後來討論「聖經沒有戀愛觀」理論的第一個論點──聖經並無關於戀愛的律法與教導。極端改革宗的這個論點，反應了他們的一個預設立場：他們認為，聖經說可以作的，我們才可以作，而聖經如果沒有說可以作，那我們就不能作。這立場並不符合聖經本身的教導。加爾文討論「基督徒的自由」 (Christian liberty) 時，引用林前六12、十23，提出「凡事都可行」，只要律法沒有禁止的，我們都可以作。同樣地，利未記多處提到「耶和華所吩咐不可行的什麼事」(參利四-五)，舊約聖經也多處提到有人犯了神所吩咐不可行的事 (例王下十七12)，但從來沒有說有人因作了耶和華未允許也未禁止的事而觸犯祂。簡言之，聖經的原則是，只要神沒有禁止的，我們都可以作。這就是「基督徒的自由」。

聖經有許多關於婚姻的規範，譬如婚姻乃是一男一女、婚姻以外的性行為都是姦淫等，這就讓我們看見，神設立的婚姻是神聖的、特殊的，有許多規範。你不能在這規範之外，尋求另一種婚姻；你不能去找個同性的人結婚；你不能在配偶之外找第三個人一起上床。

聖經關於婚姻的規範，當然也影響到婚前的戀愛，譬如婚前不能與對方同居。但除此之外，聖經並未直接設立關於戀愛的律法。這就代表，戀愛的方式有很大的彈性。當然，有些方式比較有智慧，有些方式比較危險，但只要不違反聖經，那麼都可行。網戀、遠距戀愛、相親，都可行。有人選擇婚前不接吻，有人在婚前就很親密，但沒有在肉體上犯罪，這些也都可行。有人一進入戀愛就馬上委身，有人要先作朋友或以「開放關係」的模式交往，以免太快委身會變成「走在神前面」：或許後者更有智慧，但前者也非不可行。正因聖經沒有禁止婚前戀愛，也沒有直接規範婚前戀愛的模式，所以婚前戀愛是很自由的。

然而，「基督徒的自由」還有一個重要的原則：「凡事都可行，但不都有益處。」保羅的原則是，我們在所行的事上要以討神喜悅為首要目的，在此前提下藉所行之事造就人(參林前十)。此外，保羅還說：「凡事我都可行，但不都有益處。凡事我都可行，但無論哪一件，我總不受他的轄制」(林前六12)。所謂「轄制」，在聖經中總是與「罪」、「仇敵」等概念放在一起；在「轄制」之下，人無法自由地敬拜神、以神為生命的主宰。如此，戀愛可以很自由，但假如戀愛成為轄制你的偶像、讓你無法在生命中以神為中心，那麼你就得罪神了。此外，如果你的戀愛不造就你自己、不造就對方、不造就教會與眾人，那麼你的戀愛也不能討神喜悅。談戀愛的過程，應該讓基督徒更親近神、更成為眾人的祝福，因此，聖經說「你們與不信的原不相配，不可同負一軛」，這原則也適用於婚前的戀愛──戀愛應該是兩個信神的人共負一軛來榮神益人。

此外，戀愛是非常自由的，但神知道人在自由當中就容易犯罪，所以神雖未如規範婚姻那樣用律法來規範戀愛，但神用許多基督徒處事的基本原則 (也就是所謂「世界觀」)來引導基督徒的戀愛。例如，聖經教導神的預定與掌管，以及基督徒應該如何明白神的心意、如何區分神「隱藏的旨意」與「顯明的旨意」(參申廿九29)。這是很大的課題，在此不贅，但總之，明白這課題，就能夠將其應用在戀愛上面。聖經當中關於神的預定與掌管的教導，一樣可以用來作為生活其它部份的指引。這就是將「世界觀」應用於「戀愛觀」。聖經給了我們一套整全的世界觀，因此，聖經對於「如何談戀愛」，是有許多指引的。

由此看來，(1) 聖經允許婚前自由戀愛，且自由戀愛可以蒙神喜悅；(2) 聖經賜給我們一套的世界觀作為信仰與生活的指引，我們必須用這些基本原則來談戀愛，才能在戀愛中蒙神喜悅。

後來，家父、家母在溫哥華東區找到一間非常「另類」的教會，招待人員堪稱「粗暴」，領詩同工用五音不全的嗓子嘶吼，詩班獻詩像農村團隊唱共產黨軍歌。但這教會有一種莫名的感染力，是我們這些從小在教會長大的人沒見過的。最令人嘖嘖稱奇的是牧師的講道。他當時信主不久，曾投身海外民運及科研，獲常春藤名校博士，為福音的緣故成為牧師。家父、家母在這間教會待了下來，我跟他們去參加了一次主日崇拜，從此就沒再離開過。大學畢業後，直接進入神學院，同時也開始在這間教會擔任教牧，一轉眼就是五年。現在我已離職，到英國讀博士，雖在外地固定聚會並成為另一間教會會友，但我至今仍未放棄溫哥華教會的會籍。每次回溫哥華，我仍固定在這間教會聚會。

我愛這間教會，不是因為她可愛。她的確有很可愛的地方──特別是其中的弟兄姊妹。但我十五年前就體會到教會是罪人聚集之處，而牧者往往是罪人中的罪魁。我自己成為教牧後，更深刻地體會到「牧者也是罪人」的道理。其實這不需要從經驗去學，聖經早就講得很清楚了，只不過罪人往往喜歡替自己造偶像。中國古代有皇權崇拜，近代有毛、蔣所帶領的造神運動，同樣一群罪人，來到教會後，就把牧師當成了神在地上的代表，又將教會當成伊甸園。會眾往往對教會、對牧師充滿浪漫的幻想。十五年前，我們曾幻想一個「白白撿來的恩典」，同工們未曾對牧者進行適當的監督，以致縱容他的團隊在教會內進行分裂。當同工覺察時，為時已晚。若我們當年好好研究聖經關於教會治理的教導，或可明白教會不該無條件信任主任牧師，因為牧師都是罪人。

我們若禱告求神使牧師不致犯罪，卻從不在實際行動上規勸、監督牧師，這豈不就像求神賜「日用的飲食」，卻不耕種、不烹飪，等著神從天上降餡餅？我們當年不懂聖經的道理，浪漫地幻想一個「白白撿來的恩典」，結果心愛的教會就煙消雲散了。兩派教牧在主日崇拜中相互指控，其內容並非全然憑空捏造；會眾對教會的愛，成了鬥爭者手中的工具。會眾愛教會，自然就會選擇站在他們認為正在保護教會的那一方，但事實上他們對內幕又了解多少？不了解內幕就選邊站，他們對教會的愛，就成了結黨者手中的利器。十五年前，「白白撿來的恩典」帶領一個教牧團隊在教會中呼風喚雨，許多人灰心離去，後來這團隊自己又分成了兩個黨派，醜陋的戲碼在教會中上演，那些愛教會卻不明白聖經教導的會眾隨之起舞，好好一間教會就散了。發生這種事情時，為何愛教會的人要選邊站、選擇信任其中一方？為何不趕緊勤讀聖經，信靠神的話語，明白神的心意？

*************

家母曾以「耶穌潔淨聖殿」為題材，說了一番發人深省的道理。耶穌潔淨聖殿時，殿中肯定有一群人是真敬畏神、跟隨耶穌的。但這些人大概無法理解耶穌的作為。看見牛羊跑了、鴿子飛了，他們會想：「我們還拿什麼獻祭？」他們會趕緊把這些鳥獸抓回來。桌子翻了，聖殿亂了，他們趕緊重新整理聖殿。其實聖殿當初成為賊窩，他們本來也不好受，但現在耶穌把聖殿給翻了，他們更感受到切身的痛。他們定睛於令人痛心的事上，痛到睡不著覺。

信心鐵則：當基督徒找不到安慰的時候，就代表他們目光注視於錯誤的目標。聖殿中那些愛教會的人，定睛於被耶穌掀翻的聖殿，而忽視了掀翻聖殿的耶穌。豈不知耶穌潔淨聖殿，是為了帶給我們安慰？我們是否看見耶穌愛教會到如此程度，不惜用最激烈的方法來潔淨教會？許多基督徒看見教會的問題，卻以「不可以卵擊石」為由姑息之；看見牧師出了問題，卻以為逆來順受是「生命的操練」；教牧間在不得已撕破臉前，極盡「遮掩」之能事，以為這就是「愛中合一」。感謝主，耶穌愛教會，不是這種愛法，所以我們可以放心地把教會交託在祂手中。祂是潔淨聖殿的主。

*************

不要忘記，我們信聖而公之教會，她是無形的教會。十五年前，可愛的小教會散了，弟兄姊妹各自去了不同教會。最近在Facebook上找到許多當年會友的孩子，跟我年紀差不多，除了我之外，還有一位成了傳道人，其他也都在各地繼續服事神。若當年心愛的小教會沒散，我今日又會在哪裡？有時候我們愛某間教會過於愛基督、信任某位牧者如同信靠神，這是神不喜悅的。若教會落入這樣的光景，那麼我們應該求耶穌來潔淨聖殿。若經歷耶穌潔淨聖殿的痛，我們就有得安慰的確據。

*************

我對自己教會的教導、治理有許多批評，也多次公開表述。教會中有些人很討厭我們牧師，會引用我的話來攻擊牧師。這些人時不時會想辦法接近我，但我始終與他們保持距離。他們反對的是牧師這個人；我反對的是他的一些教導及理念，以及治理教會的一些原則及方法。兩個禮拜前，好友的婚禮上，牧師滿面笑容與我握手，我霎時間感到一瞬熟悉的喜悅。誠然，他這個人也有許多令我感到難以相處的地方，我不會謊稱我喜歡他，坦白說，他許多理念及作為令我非常生氣難過，但我仍非常在乎他。我十七歲就來到他的教會，是在這裡長大的！婚禮上的證道，讓許多對他有成見的人感到他又在推銷自己教會，但我認為那是一篇非常精彩的道。事實上，就連在我與牧師關係最緊張時，有一次聽他一篇講道，我仍感動到流下眼淚。有些弟兄姊妹反對牧師這個「人」，所以他講出來的道，他們都聽不進去。許多人因為我對牧師在神學上作出一些公開批評，就支持我、喜歡我。我又不是共產黨！「敵人的敵人就是朋友」？少來！牧師不是我的敵人！「為牧師守望」及「與牧師為敵」只有一線之差，其距離正如撒但「捶胸頓足」及「手舞足蹈」之間的差異。

*************

耶穌愛教會，不是因為教會可愛。教會是罪人聚集的地方；教會不是靠聖潔的表象吸引人，而是靠基督的十字架。當教會發生醜陋的事時，許多人會被絆倒，也會有許多軟弱者因此得剛強。從前愛教會，是因為教會很溫暖，聚會感覺很聖潔，牧師講道發人深省。當教會上演醜陋的戲碼，溫暖不再，我們卻仍不放棄，繼續為她守望時，我們就稍體會到基督愛教會的心了。牧師雖然犯罪，我們卻仍陪伴他，以安慰、監督、責備、懲戒來支持他，而非姑息他的罪或對他暗中懷恨，那麼照著聖經的應許，「愛能遮掩許多的過犯」，這樣還有誰能控告我們呢？

第二代基督徒的流失，是許多教會面臨的問題。筆者牧養青少年的經歷中，看過不少基督徒家長因子女遠離神而擔憂流淚。令人欣慰的是，許多基督徒家長最關心的並非子女的學業、交友、事業，而是孩子的信仰。這些家長從子女年幼時就開始教導他們敬畏神，把孩子帶到教會，並在家中帶孩子操練「家庭祭壇」。到底問題出在哪裡？為什麼許多從小在敬虔家庭中長大的孩子，進入青春期後卻開始遠離神？就此問題，心理學家及教育學家提出許多意見，他們的貢獻毋庸置疑，但若不深思人的罪與神的恩典，恐怕這些專家的洞見只能治標而不治本。因此，我們必須以神的話語為出發點來討論這問題。本文所要提出的論點是：假如我們不讓孩子們看見「十字架討厭的地方」（加五11），那麼就別奢望他們能夠認識神、愛祂、敬畏祂。這論點似乎有些突兀──怎會有愛主的基督徒允許自己子女討厭神呢？

「十字架討厭的地方」
保羅講這句話時，是從割禮的爭議出發，與加拉太教會的猶太主義者辯論稱義的問題：究竟罪人被神稱義，是靠自己行出的義，還是因信與基督聯合而得著基督的義？在此保羅耐人尋味地說道，假如我們稱義是靠行律法，「那十字架討厭的地方就沒有了」。保羅問道，若十字架失去其令人討厭之處，基督的福音還值得使徒為其受逼迫嗎（11節）？可見，十字架討厭之處，也正是福音價值之所在。

問題是，十字架有何討厭之處？十字架冒犯的對象又是誰？「討厭的地方」一詞原文是skandalon，意思包括「冒犯」、「汙點」、「絆腳石」，是英文scandal（醜聞）的字源。保羅在羅九33及林前一23用這個字，稱釘十架的基督為猶太律法主義者的絆腳石。因此，十字架所冒犯的對象是那些想靠行為稱義的人。我們可能因此認為，凡信靠基督的人，就不會討厭十字架。

但我們若明白十字架何處令人討厭，恐怕就不會這樣想了。關於十字架的論述，教會史上鮮見比馬丁路德「十架神學」更深刻的省思，可惜本文篇幅有限，無法作完整的介紹。路德指出，十字架不但是律法主義者的絆腳石，更是神在基督裡對祂兒女的羞辱。神用基督的十字架讓祂兒女一次次看見自己是何等罪人，每次犯罪，就在基督身上多加一道釘痕。在十字架前，神的兒女一次次被剝去身上衣衫，變得赤身露體。但我們必須強調，這並非神的最終目的。神在十架蔭下剝去我們的襤褸衣衫，是為了用基督的寶血遮蓋我們。然而，儘管我們已被基督寶血遮蓋，十字架卻仍像一面鏡子，不斷照出我們罪人的本相。一方面我們知道基督的義已加給我們，另一方面我們卻更深刻地看見自己的罪性。十字架不斷羞辱我們，卻又不斷遮蓋我們的羞恥。我們討厭十字架，因為它使我們無法自我感覺良好。

正因我們罪惡的本性不斷與基督相抗，所以保羅提到「十字架討厭的地方」後，立即指出信徒今生的屬靈爭戰：「情慾和聖靈相爭，聖靈和情慾相爭，使你們不能做所願意做的」（加五17）。這節經文與羅七前後呼應，讓我們看見，我們與基督的聯合（參加二19-20），使我們無法完全放任自己的私慾，但我們的罪又使我們無法自由地活出基督加在我們身上的義。儘管我們已信了基督，在本性上卻仍與基督為敵。

保羅如此表達這種內在掙扎的心境：「我真是苦啊！」（羅七24） 然而，正如上述所言，十字架在信徒一生中所帶來的痛苦，並非神的最終目的。因此，保羅強調：「如今，那些在基督耶穌裡的就不定罪了」（羅八1）；「現在的苦楚若比起將來要顯於我們的榮耀，就不足介意了」（羅八18）。緊接著，保羅將這種內在爭扎的苦楚，與「患難」、「困苦」、「逼迫」、「飢餓」、「赤身露體」、「危險」、「刀劍」、死亡等外在苦難相提並論（羅八35-36）。內在的掙扎與外在的苦難，共通之處就在於神使「萬事都互相效力」──路德稱之為「神的工」（opus Dei）──皆發生於神的掌管之下。

這就產生一個問題：神若愛祂的兒女，為何讓祂兒女遭受這些內在的試探與外在的苦難？神是全能者，可以阻止這一切，但祂卻允許這一切發生。這是否代表神其實並不愛我們，不把我們當成祂兒女？

保羅對這項質疑的回答是：一切試探與苦難「都不能叫我們與神的愛隔絕；這愛是在我們的主基督耶穌裡的」（羅八39）。我們不知為何神讓我們失去許多珍愛的事物，包括心愛的人，但我們深知神「不愛惜自己的兒子為我們眾人捨了」（羅八32）。因此，希伯來書的作者提到了信徒所遭遇的種種苦難後，勸勉讀者要定睛「仰望為我們信心創始成終的耶穌」（來十二2）。換言之，上帝拒絕用其它方法為自己辯護；釘十架的基督，是神對這些疑難的惟一答案。

魯益師（C.S. Lewis）痛失愛妻後，在《卿卿如晤》（A Grief Observed）中將約伯的上帝比作一個反覆無常的小丑，毫無來由地打翻某人手中的一碗湯，只為了在下一刻將一模一樣的一碗湯賜給他。魯益師指天罵地一番，說道上帝如此可惡，若上帝有赦罪權柄，應該先赦免祂自己。但上帝並未赦免祂自己；祂走上了十字架。念及十字架，魯益師才開始重新找到平安。十字架是神的沉默、神的自我隱藏，正如魯益師所言，是神的「No Answer」，然而這是一種特殊的「No Answer」，好像一位慈父搖搖手，不是在拒絕孩子的問題，而是延遲祂的答案，似乎是在說：「孩子啊，平靜下來，你現在還無法明白。」信心並非建立在無法明白的事上；信心的基礎是我們確知的真理，即神藉著基督在十字架上向我們顯明的公義、慈愛、全能。

信心的主觀層面
所謂信心，就是如此定睛仰望耶穌基督，在基督裡確知公義全能的父神對我們的愛。魯益師在寫《返璞歸真》（Mere Christianity）時，精闢地探討基督教的客觀真理。然而，信心是對客觀真理的主觀回應。痛失愛妻後，上帝在魯益師的主觀認知上變成一個不可理喻的虐待狂，儘管魯益師承認，這種認知客觀上並不合理。

筆者發現，許多敬虔父母在教育子女時，非常強調聖經的客觀真理：神的存在、全能、良善等。這當然非常重要，然而，他們所謂「敬虔教育」，基本上就是告訴子女：「我們沒有理由不愛神。」的確，客觀上，我們沒有理由不愛神。

很可惜，我們經常忽略信心的主觀性，以致否認我們內心深處對神的一些負面認知與感受。客觀上，神是我們慈愛的父，但我們作為罪人，在主觀的認知上，常常會懷疑神對我們的愛。這不光是一種感覺；我們經常在理性上對上帝提出種種質疑，因為理性是墮落的。然而，我們不敢承認我們對神有種種負面的認知、感受；我們不敢正視自己的罪，因為我們不敢信靠神的恩典。我們骨子裡還是想靠行為稱義；我們以「敬虔」當作自我感覺良好的本錢。

保羅提到「十字架討厭的地方」，並不是指十字架本身很討厭，而是指罪人對十字架的主觀認知。就算我們實質上已經披戴基督的義，但我們終其一生在本性上仍是完全的罪人。因此，十字架會讓信徒一輩子討厭神。

假如我們從不討厭十字架，我們就從未真正認識神的恩典，也從未真正認識自己的罪；假如我們尚未學會討厭神，那麼我們對神的愛，永遠是表面而虛浮的。怎麼教導我們下一代去認識神、愛祂、敬畏祂？「十字架討厭的地方」就是關鍵。

很可惜，許多愛主的家長，從不給幼年子女懷疑神、討厭神的空間。有些孩子週日想參加朋友的派對，但他們必須上教會。他們可能到後來內心深處對教會產生反感，因為教會奪去了他們的快樂。但他們從小就學會否認。他們不敢去碰心裡那塊討厭神的地方，因為他們以為討厭神就是「不敬虔」，而他們所受的「敬虔教育」，就是要靠敬虔來肯定自己的價值。他們漸漸長大，不願再虛偽地否認內心的欲望時，就離開教會。

在理性上，許多孩子從小就學會否認自己對神的種種懷疑。很多主日學老師能夠回答孩子的疑問，但少有老師懂得幫助孩子看見自己疑問背後的罪性，更別說教導孩子坦然無懼地帶著自己的罪與疑問來到十架蔭下求答案。許多教會裡的孩子與神起衝突時，屬靈長輩總是替神辯護，直到有一天，孩子們找到這些辯護的漏洞時，就歡喜地認定自己是對的、神是錯的。我們以為替神辯護，就可守住孩子的信仰。

然而，信與不信的區別，不在於我們是否承認神是對的。真正的信徒，有時也會懷疑神；有名無實的基督徒，也會承認神的真理。真假信心的區別，在於一個人用什麼樣的態度來面對他與神的衝突：有真信心的人，總希望神是對的；假信的人，總希望自己是對的。同樣地，愛神與不愛神的人，同樣會討厭神，當然有時也會喜歡神（特別是生活順利的時候）。兩者的區別在於：愛神的人，發現自己討厭神時，心裡並不喜樂，內心深處會希望與神言歸於好；不愛神的人，會用心安理得的態度去討厭神。我們如何引導孩子愛神、信靠神？

結語
我們若不給孩子懷疑神、討厭神的空間，他們就學不會信靠神、愛神。聖經中充滿這樣的例子。以利亞擊敗巴力先知，以色列卻更加邪惡，因此以利亞對神充滿憤怒與不解。一番掙扎之後，以利亞終於在溫柔的微風中聽見神的聲音，也因此更認識神、更愛祂（參王上十九）。基督復活後，多馬用褻瀆的言語對基督復活的喜訊嗤之以鼻，這使得他在耶穌顯現時，戰兢敬畏地稱呼耶穌：「我的主、我的神。」（參約廿24-28）彼得三次不認主後，終於看見自己的罪性，也更深刻地認識基督的恩典，因此在耶穌復活後，他不以為恥地三次回答耶穌：「主，我愛祢」（參約十八、廿一）。

基督為何說「凡婦人所生的，沒有一個興起來大過施洗約翰的」？是因為約翰的信心堅定、永不軟弱嗎？不，耶穌說這話時，約翰正下在監裡，開始懷疑耶穌是否就是先知所應許的彌賽亞。但約翰懂得定睛仰望基督。他懷疑耶穌時，不用邏輯推理、經驗歸納，也不靠宗教情感，直接打發門徒去找耶穌，訴說他的疑惑（參太十一2-11）。

回到剛才的問題：我們怎樣引導孩子學習信心的功課？惟一的答案：定睛仰望基督十架討厭的地方，以坦然認識自己的罪，並被基督的恩典吸引。神知道我們是罪人，對祂充滿質疑，所以祂邀請我們：「你們來，我們彼此辯論。」（賽一18）我們準備了萬卷辯詞，一面控告神，一面準備在神面前自稱為義。但神並未替自己辯護，反而用十字架稱我們為義：「你們的罪雖像硃紅，必變成雪白。雖紅如丹顏，必白如羊毛。」這無非是神對想自稱為義的人最嚴重的冒犯，然而十字架討厭的地方，也正是神恩典最寶貴之處。藉由十字架認識神、認識自己的人，是真正信神、愛神的人，儘管他們仍會討厭、懷疑神。鼓勵我們的孩子跟神辯論吧。祂已經賜下主耶穌的十字架了！

Recently I touched upon the issue of ecumenism with a friend, and in our discussion I mentioned the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justificaiton (henceforth abbreviated as JD) of 1999 (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Declaration_on_the_Doctrine_of_Justification for a brief introduction). Here I will give a brief evaluation thereof. In order to appreciate the extent to which JD succeeds in representing the commonalities and differences between Lutherans and Catholics, I will begin by briefly comparing the doctrine of justification as presented by Luther and the Council of Trent.

Luther on Justification

At the heart of Luther’s doctrine of justification is the concept of participatio Christi, which serves as the basis of the “wondrous exchange” whereby our sins are imputed to Christ and Christ’s righteousness is imputed to us through faith. This imputation is not merely an external declaration, as if it were a legal fiction. Rather, “everyone who believes in [Christ] really has no sins, because they have been transferred to Christ” (Against Latomus, 200). For this reason, the believer is reckoned righteous. Note that Luther’s doctrine of justification is strongly monergistic: Even the faith by which sinners are justified is wrought in Christ’s person and communicated to us in union with Christ. For Luther, fallen humans are so depraved that they have nothing in and of themselves that may merit the grace of justification.

Several implications follow from this basic understanding of justification. First, while Christ’s righteousness is really communicated to the sinner, it always remains an alien righteousness wrought in and by the person and work of Christ. Second, it follows that the believer is already completely and really made righteous, and yet will ever remain a sinner in this life—simul justus et peccator. Third, since it is by the imputation of Christ’s perfect righteousness that the sinner is justified, no sin whatsoever committed by the believer may threaten his or her salvation. On this note, Luther does not distinguish between venial and mortal sin. For Luther, all sins are real and remain real after baptism, and without the wondrous exchange, no sinner may escape the wrath of God. This high view of sin underscores the significance of both justification and sanctification: “God saves real, not imaginary, sinners, and he teaches us to mortify real rather than imaginary sin” (Ibid., 229). According to Luther, justification and sanctification are two distinct but inseparable consequences of participatio Christi. Sanctification is the fruit and manifestation of justification—the real imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the sinner. As such sanctification depends on justification, and not vice versa. In this sense, we may conclude that in Luther’s understanding, justification, which is already complete in Christ alone, by grace alone and through faith alone, is both necessary and sufficient for the salvation of sinners.

The Council of Trent on Justification

By contrast, according to the Catholic view, justification, which remains incomplete during the present life, is necessary but insufficient for salvation: “Faith, co-operating with good works, increase in that justice which they have received through the grace of Christ, and are still further justified” (Ch. X). To be sure, justification is initially the work of God alone and cannot take place “without the grace of God through Jesus Christ” (Canon I). However, God “moves and excites” human free will such that it may “co-operate towards disposing and preparing itself for obtaining the grace of justification” (Canon IV). It is in this synergistic sense that “faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation, and root of all Justification” (Ch. VIII). Note that the emphasis here falls on the necessity of faith for justification, but not its sufficiency. After baptism, the grace of justification is maintained by the love formed in the believer with divine help. Out of love, the believer obeys God’s commandments. However, the believer may also choose to disobey God and fall into sin, thereby losing the grace of justification: “For God forsakes not those who have been once justified by His grace, unless He be first forsaken by them” (Ch. XI). Therefore, on top of the sacrament of baptism that marks the beginning of justification by faith, Trent emphasizes the importance of the sacrament of penance that provides the possibility for the restoration of those who have “fallen from the received grace of Justification” (Ch. XIV). Furthermore, those who have fallen into venial sin may be restored, but those who have committed mortal sins will lose the grace of justification, even though their faith may remain, and to restore their justified status is highly difficult (Ch. XV). That is to say, faith is necessary for the initiation of justification, but is insufficient to sustain it. In addition, the merit of Christ is also necessary but insufficient for justification: Humans cannot be “just without the justice of Christ,” but it is not “by that justice itself that they are formally just” (Canon X); humans cannot be “justified… by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ… to the exclusion of the grace and charity which is… inherent in them” (Canon XI). That is to say, the righteousness of Christ imputed to the believer is insufficient for justification without love, which is the fruit of the Holy Spirit exercised by the believer’s free will. In sum, on the Catholic view, there are threefold necessities and insufficiencies in the doctrine of justification: 1. Faith is necessary for the initiation but insufficient for the sustention of justification; 2. Christ’s righteousness is necessary but insufficient for justification; and 3. the grace of justification is necessary but insufficient for salvation unto eternal life.

The Joint Declaration: Ambiguities on Necessity and Sufficiency

A striking feature of the JD is the Catholic consent to adopt the Reformation language of the solas. Does this indicate that the Catholics have moved away from Trent towards a monergistic understanding of justification? What do Catholics mean when they adopt the sola language? In an attempt to answer these questions, I will examine the ambiguities in the JD’s formulation of the necessity and sufficiency of Christ, grace and faith for salvation.

The first mention of the solas is in paragraph 15, which Cardinal Dulles calls “the heart of the Joint Declaration” (Dulles 2): “Together we confess: By grace alone, in faith in Christ’s saving work and not because of any merit on our part, we are accepted by God and receive the Holy Spirit, who renews our hearts while equipping and calling us to good works.” Note several ambiguities here. First and most important, this statement speaks of grace in terms of Christ’s work but says nothing about Christ’s person. This avoids the difficulty of having to deal with different understandings of participatio Christi. As we have seen, Luther’s understanding of our being in Christ makes Christ’s grace, wrought in and by Christ’s person and work, both necessary and sufficient for salvation. In comparison, according to Trent, the believer is joined with Christ in such a way that Christ “continually infuses his virtue” into the justified, so that in cooperation with Christ’s grace they may obtain eternal life. In this sense, for the Lutherans, “grace alone” means that grace is both necessary and sufficient for salvation, while for the Catholics, it means that grace is necessary but must be accompanied with human cooperation.

Second, this ambivalence is further suggested in the next part of the statement above, which denies that human merit plays any part when we are “accepted by God,” and emphasizes at the same time that once God has accepted us, we receive the Holy Spirit “who renews our hearts while equipping and calling us to good works.” Catholics who subscribe to Trent may well agree that our acceptance by God is “not because of any merit on our part” in the sense that justification is initiated by God, but they would emphasize that we cannot sustain our justification without good works. Protestants, however, would contend with Luther that Christ’s grace is sufficient for our salvation, and that good works are only the result and manifestation of our being in Christ.

Third, note that paragraph 15 of the JD consistently avoids mentioning whether grace is sufficient for salvation. The first sentence says that “justification is the work of the triune God” without mentioning whether it involves human cooperation. The third sentence says that Christ’s incarnation, death and resurrection are the “foundation and presupposition of justification,” implying that Christ’s grace is necessary for justification, but says nothing about its sufficiency.

Dulles comments on paragraph 15 that “by mentioning both faith and works, both acceptance by God and the gift of the Holy Spirit, this sentence strikes an even-handed balance calculated to satisfy both sides,” which “dispels some false stereotypes inherited from the past” (Dulles 2). Indeed, this paragraph helps to clarify that Lutherans are not antinomian. However, it is not true that “Lutherans have often accused Catholics of holding that justification is a human achievement rather than a divine gift received in faith” (Ibid., emphasis mine). The Reformation understands the Catholic doctrine of justification as synergism, that is, cooperation between God’s grace and human freedom. This Protestant understanding of Roman Catholicism, in the current analysis, has not been dispelled by the ambiguous statements in paragraph 15 of the JD, as it still leaves room for a synergistic interpretation of the doctrine of justification.

The next ambivalent usage of the sola language is found in paragraph 16: “Through Christ alone are we justified.” The preposition is again designed to avoid dealing with the heart of the dispute between Lutherans and Catholics, viz. participatio Christi. The Reformation would emphasize that we are justified in Christ, and it is our being in Christ that enables us to be justified by Christ and through Christ. That is to say, we are first united with Christ (in); in union with Christ He communicates His righteousness to us (by); by virtue of the alien righteousness which is really made ours in Christ, God declares that we are righteous (through). Note that this external declaration has its basis in the real imputation of righteousness, and as such it is not a legal fiction. This view of justification, as we have seen, excludes any synergistic interpretation.

However, when the JD employs only one preposition (through), it leaves room for the Catholics to interpret solus Christus as merely the “meritorious cause” of justification, which is necessary for salvation but insufficient without human good works as a result of the “infusion” of “faith, hope, and charity” “through Christ” (Trent Ch. VII).

Finally, on the third sola, Catholics are unable to confess with the Lutherans that justification is by faith alone. In paragraph 25, Catholics and Lutherans “confess together that sinners are justified by faith.” Paragraph 26, which expounds the Lutheran view, says that “God justifies sinners in faith alone,” while paragraph 27 says that “the Catholic understanding also sees faith as fundamental in justification.” These paragraphs suggest that Catholics and Lutherans agree upon the necessity of faith in justification, but whereas Lutherans see faith, which is part and parcel of the grace communicated to us in union with Christ, as a sufficient condition for justification, Catholics would contend that faith is insufficient to retain justification. That is to say, for Lutherans, one whose faith is true will never lose the grace of justification, while for Catholics, one may retain one’s faith but still lose the grace of justification.

Conclusion

In sum, the Reformation understands justification as Christ’s perfect righteousness imputed to us in our union with Christ, and once imputed, we are in need of no further justification, even though our sins remain real and have yet to be extinguished. Roman Catholicism understands justification as an ongoing process initiated by God’s grace through Christ on the basis of our faith, which must be sustained by human cooperation with divine grace. The heart of the dispute, then, is whether and how one treats the doctrine of justification on the basis of participatio Christi. In the current analysis, the JD is far from having settled the dispute, because it has consistently avoided the heart of the dispute. This intentional ambiguity may be taken as a sign of good will on both sides, whereby a genuine desire for ecumenical unity is made apparent. Dulles is correct in stating that the different thought-forms and languages reflect real doctrinal differences between Lutherans and Catholics. In outlining these doctrinal differences, however, Dulles could have taken one step further to identify the heart of dispute as discussed above. It is doubtful whether pretending that Lutherans—and mainstream Evangelicals for that matter—and Catholics are in agreement on the doctrine of justification is the right way to further the cause of ecumenical unity.

WORKS CITED

Dulles, Avery. “Two Languages of Salvation: The Lutheran-Catholic Joint Declaration.” First Things 98 (1999): 25-30.

Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification. [On-line] available at: http://archive.elca.org/ecumenical/ecumenicaldialogue/romancatholic/jddj/index.html

Luther, Martin. Against Latomus in Works 32. Ed. George W. Forell, Helmut T. Lehmann. Trans. George Lindbeck. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1958.

Schaff, Philip, ed. “The Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent,” “Sixth Session: On Justification.” The Creeds of Christendom 2. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983.